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INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965' to give full effect to the
mandates of the Fifteenth Amendment, enacted to remove racial barriers to
the right to vote.- Ratified close to a century before the enactment of the
Voting Rights Act, the Amendment had proved a hollow promise and offered
little legal protection for Blacks who fought violence and intimidation when
effectuating their right to vote. Central to the purposes of the Act was the
notion that by ensuring and protecting access to the ballot, minorities would
1.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,

practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth
in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less Opportunity

than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or

political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members
of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
52 U.S.C.A § 10301 (2012). Claims brought pursuant to Section 2 may be based on
vote denial or vote dilution.
2.
See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548 (1969) ("[T]he
Act implemented Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination
in voting.").
3.
See DAVID T. CANNON, RACE REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION:
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 61-62 (1999)

("When federal troops withdrew and the Republican Party abandoned the South,
blacks were almost completely disenfranchised through the imposition of residency
requirements, poll taxes, literacy tests, the 'grandfather clause', physical
intimidation, other forms of disqualification, and later the white primary.").
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be able to effectively exercise their right to vote, participate unencumbered
by racial discrimination as full members of the electorate, and ultimately
achieve political equality. 4

The Voting Rights Act proved effective in removing "first-generation
barriers" to voting and Blacks began to register in staggering numbers.6
These successes were not without setbacks, however, because as "[b]lacks
began to register and vote in increasing numbers, their electoral expectations
were frustrated by political institutions that were well-insulated from
challenge."' To challenge these political institutions, plaintiffs targeted
electoral systems and practices with dilutionary effects on minority voting
strength. 8 These particular challenges, known as vote dilution claims, focused
on challenging electoral systems and structures that diluted the voting
strength of minority voters vis-A-vis non-minority voters." The advent of
these "second-generation barriers"" to the ballot signaled a shift from
explicit exclusionary practices to dilutive electoral devices by state and local
subdivisions.' That in turn shifted the focus from questions of whether a
4.
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the PoliticalProcess:
The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838

(1992) ("The forces behind the Voting Rights Act assumed that curbing black
disenfranchisement would lead inevitably to the right to full political equality,
including the election of the representatives of choice of the black community.").
5.
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1991); Samuel
Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 210 ("Instances of the complete exclusion of entire classes of

people from the franchise propelled what has been termed the 'first generation' of
voting rights cases.").
See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 21 (Bernard Grofmuan & Chandler
6.

Davidson, eds., 1992).
7.
Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1839.
8.
Id.
9.

Id.

10. Guinier, supra note 5, at 1093.
11. See id. (citations omitted) ("Initially, blacks focused primarily on first
generation, direct impediments to electoral participation, such as registration and
voting barriers. Once these obstacles were surmounted, however, the focus shifted
to second generation, indirect structural barriers such as at large, vote-diluting
elections."). One conservative commentator offers a similar view. See ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALLY
FAIR ELECTIONS 2-3 (2009) ("But in the racist South, it soon became clear, that
equality could not be achieved-as originally hoped-simply by giving blacks the
vote. Merely providing access to the ballot was insufficient after centuries of slavery,
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particular voting standard, practice or procedure outright denied minorities
access to the ballot, to whether the particular policy impaired the
effectiveness of that right to vote. 2
Comprehensive voting rights laws have once again become necessary to
protect the voting rights of minority groups and to ensure these groups equal
opportunity to participate in the political process." New forms of vote denial
directly implicate access to the ballot.1 4 Like their predecessors, the new vote
denial' claims involve "practices that disproportionately exclude minority
voters from participating in the electoral process at all.""' Similar to the
earliest forms of race-based disenfranchisement, the most recent wave of vote
denial claims directly "implicate the value of participation." 7 These types of
claims can be distinguished from vote dilution cases that "involve 'practices
that diminish minorities' political influence,' such as at-large elections and
another century of segregation, ongoing white racism, and persistent resistance to
black political power. More aggressive measures were needed.").
12. Guinier, supra note 5, at 1093.
I3. See, e.g., Andres A. Gonzales, Creating a More Perfect Union: How
Congress Can Rebuild the Voting Rights Act, 27 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65,
86-7 (2017) (arguing that revitalization of Section 2 of the VRA's protections need
to be reinstated, but the current political landscape makes that unlikely); see also An
Berman, Rep. John Lewis: 'The Voting Rights Act is Needed Now Like Never
Befbre', NATION (July 17, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/rep-jolin-

lewis-voting-rights-act-needed-now-never/.
14. See Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1197-98 (11th Cr.
1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a), now 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (a)) ("Vote denial occurs
when a state . . employs a 'standard, practice, or procedure' that results in the denial
of the right to vote on account of race."); see also Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24.
29 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) ("'[V]ote denial' refers to practices that prevent
people from voting or having their votes counted.").
15. 1borrow this term from Prof. Tokaji. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote
Denial: Where Election Refrbin Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689,

691-92 (2006) ("The application of the VRA to practices such as felon
disenfranchisement, voting machines, and voter ID laws represents a new generation
of VRA enforcement. This article collectively refers to these practices as the 'new
vote denial."').
16. Id. at 719.
17. Id. at 718: see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives:
Defending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2006) ("In using

the term 'participation,' I mean to draw a distinction with representation-between
voting and having one's vote counted on the one hand and being fairly represented
in federal, state, and local political bodies on the other.").
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redistricting plans that either weaken or keep minorities' voting strength
weak.""
The new forms of vote denial include practices adopted by jurisdictions
that either intentionally or unintentionally restrict access to the ballot.' 9
Although there is some evidence that the newest forms of vote denial were
adopted with the express intent of reducing minority voter turnout, 20
"smoking gun" evidence demonstrating explicitly discriminatory intent is
few and far between.21 Yet, illicit discrimination may still be present within
electoral systems. Recognizing that there were forms of racial discrimination
that might not be captured through the intent-based standard of liability, 22
18. Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Pamela S.
Karlan, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on African Americans, in VOTING
RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING 121, 122 (M.E. Rush, ed., 1998)).
19. Denise Liberman, Barriers to the Ballot Box New Restrictions
Underscore the Need for Voting Enforcement, ABA HUM. RTS. MAG., Vol. 39

(2012), available at https://www.americanbar.org/publications/humanrightsmagazi
nehome/2012vol39/winter_2012_vote/barriers-to the ballotboxnewrestrictionsu
nderscoretheneedforvoti.html.
20. See Scott Keyes, et al., Voter Suppression 101: How Conservatives Are
Conspiring to Disenfranchise Millions of Americans, CTR. AM. PROGRESS,

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressivemovement/report/2012/04/04/
11380/voter-suppression-101/ (Apr. 4, 2012).
21. See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2014)
("There are no "smoking guns" in the form of an SB 14 sponsor making an antiAfrican-American or anti-Hispanic statement with respect to the incentive behind
the bill. However, the 2011 legislative session was a racially charged
environment."), affd in part, vacated in part, remandedsub nom. Veasey v. Abbott,

796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), on reh'g en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), and
aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216
(5th Cir. 2016). But see Christopher Ingraham, Study Finds Strong Evidence fbr
Discriminatory Intent Behind Voter ID Laws, WASH. POST, (June 3, 2014),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/06/03/study-finds-strongevidence-for-di scriminatory-intent-behindvoteridlaws/?utmterm=.06dbedl595eb.
22. As the Supreme Court stated in Gingles:
The intent test was repudiated for three principal reasons-it is
"unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part
of individual officials or entire communities," it places an "inordinately
difficult" burden of proof on plaintiffs, and it "asks the wrong question."
The "right" question, as the Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether "as
a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an
equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect
candidates of their choice."
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Congress revised Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to incorporate a
results test that, pursuant to the totality of the circumstances, 2 3 would enable
plaintiffs to present circumstantial evidence 24 that would permit the factfinder
to draw the inference of racial discrimination, even when evidence of explicit
discriminatory intent was lacking.2 5 On the whole, the results test enables
plaintiffs to demonstrate that a policy with a disproportionate racial impact,

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (quoting the Senate Report to the
1982 Amendments) (footnote omitted).
23. See 52 U.S.C. 10301(b) (2012).
24. Circumstantial evidence that would permit the factfinder to draw the
inference of discriminatory intent includes, but is not limited to, those factors
outlined in the Senate Report to the 1982 Amendments, which the Supreme Court
summarized in Gingles:
The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant
to a § 2 claim: the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or
political subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the
State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the
State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that
tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of
members of the minority group from candidate slating processes- the
extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past
discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the
use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns: and the extent
to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that
elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group and that the policy underlying the State's
or the political subdivision's use of the contested practice or structure is
tenuous may have probative value. The Report stresses, however, that this
list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive. While the
enumerated factors will often be pertinent to certain types of § 2 violations,
particularly to vote dilution claims, other factors may also be relevant and
may be considered.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45 (1986) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
25. Id.
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when coupled with other social and historical factors, 2( is a denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on account of race. In this way, the results
test can be characterized as a type of disparate "impact-plus" standard.
In recent years, courts deciding vote denial cases under Section 2 have
scaled back the disparate impact-plus standard, demonstrating an increasing
reluctance to accept circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.2 7 Stated
differently, these courts have declined to draw the inference that the
challenged electoral policy or practice, when combined with historical and
social factors, deprive minority individuals of the right to vote on account of
race, and in some cases have required an evidentiary showing amounting to
express discriminatory intent.2 This article will demonstrate how these
courts' discomfort with disparate impact-like claims in the vote dilution
context have increased the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs in Section 2 cases
challenging vote denial-a separate and distinct prong of the Voting Rights
Act involving issues of access to the ballot.2 9 Such heightened standards
increase the burdens minority plaintiffs face in challenging newer forms of
vote denial, such as voter identification laws, proof of citizenship
requirements, and reductions in early voting days, which have sprung up in
state legislatures across the country.3 0
As this article will show, the reluctance of courts to accept evidence of
"impact plus" stems in part from a concern that the remedies required by
impact-based claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act will involve
essentialism and an affront to individual dignity. These concerns are
animated in the vote dilution context where, in cases challenging the dilution
26. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 ("The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to
cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect
their preferred representatives.").
27. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 448 (2015).

28. Id. at 451.
29. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1196 (11 th Cir.
1999) ("Specifically, two distinct types of discriminatory practices and procedures
are covered under section 2: those that result in 'vote denial' and those that result in
'vote dilution."').
30. See generally Ryan P. Haygood, The Past as Prologue: De/nding
Denocracy' Against Voter Suppression Tactics on the Eve ofthe 2012 Elections, 64
RUTGERS L. REv.
efforts); BRENNAN
SUPPRESSION:

1019, 1028-1059 (2012) (discussing recent voter suppression
CENTER
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2012),

https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/ballot-security-and-voter-suppression
(documenting ballot security and voter suppression measures).
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of the minority vote, and not involving intentional vote dilution, objections
have centered on the notion that Section 2's results test requires courts to
make essentialist claims regarding minority and non-minority voting patterns
and election choices.
Such objections are misplaced in the vote denial
context, however, and as will be demonstrated below, the spillover effects
from the consternation over impact-based vote dilution in the vote denial
context have impeded the ability of plaintiffs to prevail on these challenges
in court.
Part I of the article will provide an overview of the arguments
challenging vote dilution claims on both constitutional and statutory grounds.
In particular, the section will explore the objections to impact-based vote
dilution claims on the ground that these claims promote essentialism and
require what has been construed as the impermissible remedy of proportional
racial representation. Part II will demonstrate how these objections to vote
dilution claims are misplaced in the vote denial context. Part III will
demonstrate how critiques in the vote dilution context have been imported
into the vote denial context and how judicial aversion to disparate impact
tests have limited the ability of plaintiffs to obtain relief for new forms of
vote suppression. In particular, the section will describe how judicial
consternation over the constitutionality of claims based in part on disparate
impact-given express constitutional and statutory mandates against
entitlements to proportional racial representation-have increased the
plaintiff's burden by heightening the evidentiary showing even under Section
2's more lenient results-based test. Part IV will offer grounds for resolving
the challenges faced by plaintiffs challenging new forms of vote denial.

II.

ANTI-ESSENTIALISM, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, AND
OBJECTIONS TO IMPACT-BASED CLAIMS

Vote denial claims, to the extent that there is no direct or explicit
evidence of intentional race discrimination motivating the adoption of the
particular policy denying access to the ballot,3 are based in part on disparate

31.

See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 903 (1994).

32. Although this development is a welcome sign of racial progress, such a
reality makes it difficult to justify the sweeping prophylactic protections of the
Voting Rights Act, such as the preclearance requirements of Section 5. See e.g.,
Tokaji, supra note 17, at 350 ("The obvious difficulty is that there is nowhere near
the level of intentional race discrimination in voting in 2006 that there was in

1965.").
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impact or, the disproportionate racial impact of a particular voting practice
or procedure on a minority group. As such, vote denial claims are intimately
tied to impact-based claims. 34 For example, voter qualifications, such as felon
disenfranchisement statutes, voter identification laws, or proof of citizenship
requirements, may have the effect of disenfranchising sizable swaths of the
electorate in a particular jurisdiction, thereby denying these voters the right
to vote outright.3 If the particular qualification has a disproportionate racial
impact, such that minority voters are disqualified at higher rates compared to
non-minority voters, and is enacted in a jurisdiction with, for example, a
history of racial discrimination in voting, under Section 2 plaintiffs may seek
to challenge the qualification on the ground that it denies the rights of
minority voters to participate equally in the political process and elect the
representatives of their choice.3 6
Vote denial claims may also include those practices that may not outright
deny minorities the right to vote, but function to effectively abridge that right.
As the Supreme Court has stated, claims alleging that the right to vote has
been abridged, as the term itself denotes, implies a comparative assessment.37
In assessing these claims, courts must determine whether the challenged
practice places minorities in certain jurisdictions at higher risk of vote denial
than non-minorities.3 1 Claims challenging elections administration, and in
particular the error-prone voting equipment known as punch card systems,
are examples of this type of vote denial claim. 39
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it specifically
recognized the existence of subtle forms of discrimination and revised the
Act to ensure that courts could not dismiss claims for relief in instances where
there was no direct evidence of intentional race-based discrimination. 4() As
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,41 once the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Section 2
38.
39.

See id. at 351, 368.
See id. at 369-70.
Id. at 369.
See Tokaji, supra note 15, at 704.
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 333 (2000) (discussing
in the context of a Section 5 analysis).
Id. at 334.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 878 (6th Cir. 2006),

superseded on mootness grounds, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007).

40. See, e.g., United States v. Berks County, 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 580 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (citing S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982)) ("Section 2 ensures that minority
voters are free from any election practice 'which operate[s], designedly or
otherwise' to deny them the same opportunity to participate in all phases of the
political process as other citizens.").
41. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 98-99 (1986).
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plaintiff established that that electoral practice or policy caused the
disproportionate racial impact, circumstantial evidence, as captured in the
totality of the circumstances test, 4 2 Could provide the basis for the inference

of discriminatory intent.
Yet, not long after the adoption of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, legal scholars began to identify tensions between the statute's
disparate impact provisions incorporated into the results test of Section 2and antidiscrimination norms or principles.4 3 These legal scholars proposed
arguments of various kinds in examining this tension, but one in particular
will serve as the focal point for this discussion. That argument relates to the
precise scope of what is termed as the "antidiscrimination" or
"nondiscrimination" principle of equality. 44 The antidiscrimination principle
embodies the "general principle disfavoring classifications and other
decisions and practices that depend on the race (or ethnic origin) of the parties
affected." 4 ' Constitutional scrutiny embedded within the equal protection
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment is in part premised on the
antidiscrimination principle and the notion that racial classifications are
inherently suspect and therefore must be closely scrutinized by reviewing
courts.46

Pursuant to this theory, some scholars have argued that the disparate
impact-like provisions of the Voting Rights Act are not based on any coherent
theory of nondiscrimination because neutral policies with disproportionate
impact are not policies that discriminate on the basis of race.4 7 That view is

42. See, e.g., Michael A. Wahlander, Comment, ConstitutionalCoeistence:
Preserving Felon DisenfranchisemtentLitigation Under Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 181, 185 (2008) ("This provision, known as

'the totality of circumstances test,' states that a violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown
that members of protected minority groups have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.").
See id. at 199.
See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense ofthe Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, (1976).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:
Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approachfiorn the Voting Rights Act, 69
VA. L. REv. 633, 634, 641 (1983).
43.
44.
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most clearly expounded in an article by Professor James Blumenstein, where
he argues:
Legitimate and neutral legislation can have consequences that
disadvantage a group with a disproportional racial composition.
Nevertheless, such legislation does not necessarily "discriminate"
on the basis of race. The norm of nondiscrimination is at bottom one
of procedural regularity.

. .

. Therefore, discrimination occurs only

when decisions are impermissibly based on racial criteria.
. . . Because only purposefully discriminatory conduct can
violate the principle of nondiscrimination, disproportional racial
impact by itself merely highlights the existence of racial
disadvantage. If society considers such disadvantage undesirable
because of independent principles of distributive justice, it can use
the evidence of disproportional impact as a basis for some form of
relief. Such relief furthers the independent, affirmative value of
improving the political influence of blacks and necessarily
encompasses some notion of race-based entitlements to political
influence or representation; such relief does not, however, rest on
the nondiscrimination norm embodied in the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. 4 8

In essence, these scholars argued that the Section 2 results-based test did
not constitute discrimination on the basis of race, but instead prohibited
conduct outside of the realm of equality-based constitutional prohibitions. 49
A related outgrowth of this argument is the anti-essentialism view, which
maintains that the Government may not only not classify individuals on the
basis of race, but it also may not segregate individuals into racial groups and
make claims about the individuals within these groups based on race-based
assumptions and stereotypes.i Justice Thomas's concurrence in Holder v.
Hall presents a comprehensive account of the anti-essentialism view within
the voting rights case law. ' In Hall, the Supreme Court addressed the
48. Id. at 634-36.
49. In LULAC v. Perry, for example, Chief Justice Roberts dissented from the
majority's holding that, under Section 2's "totality of the circumstances" test,
Texas's congressional redistricting plan constituted impermissible vote dilution. The
Chief Justice ultimately concluded that, "[w]hatcver the majority believes it is
fighting with its holding, it is not vote dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity."

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006).
50. Hall, 512 U.S. at 905, 907-08.
51. Id. at 903, 907.
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question of whether the size of a political governing body could be challenged
by plaintiffs as vote dilution.5 2 Black plaintiffs from Bleckley County brought
suit to challenge the "single-commissioner" 3 voting scheme whereby one
commissioner, responsible for carrying out the managerial duties for the
County, was elected pursuant to an at-large electoral scheme. 4 The Black
voters, who comprised about one-fifth of the eligible voting age population,7
challenged the single-commissioner scheme on the grounds that it "was
enacted or maintained with an intent to exclude or to limit the political
influence of the county's black community....
The plaintiffs challenged the single commissioner scheme on both
constitutional and statutory grounds. 7 With respect to their statutory claims,
the plaintiffs argued that the single-commissioner scheme violated Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act as impermissible vote dilution.58 On this ground, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on a
challenge to the size of the governing body.> The Court reasoned that the
plaintiffs could not articulate any "reasonable alternative benchmarks"-6` by
which the Court could use to distinguish the undiluted vote. Without such a
benchmark, the choices available with respect to the size of the governing
body were "inherently standardless,"*' and in conflict with Supreme Court
precedent requiring a reasonable benchmark by which to measure vote
dilution. 2
Justice Thomas, in an oft-cited concurring opinion joined by Justice
Scalia, announced his view that the text of Voting Rights Act did not
encompass impact-based vote dilution challenges and that the Court should

52. Id. at 884-85.
53. Id. at 876.
54. Id. at 874.
55. See id. at 876.
56. Id. at 877.
57. Id. at 877-78.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 885.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 880 (citation omitted) ("In a § 2 vote dilution suit, along with
determining whether the Gingles preconditions are met and whether the totality of
the circumstances supports a finding of liability, a court must find a reasonable
alternative practice as a benchmark against which to measure the existing voting
practice.").
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no longer permit such challenges. 3 Justice Thomas's opinion set forth
several arguments for why impact-based vote dilution claims exceeded the
scope of constitutional prohibitions against race discrimination as well as the
scope of the Act. 64 The opinion's focus on voting strength illustrates one
challenge. Justice Thomas contended that determinations of voting strengths
are not only without standards, but effectively linked to entitlements to
proportional representation by minority groups.' 5 Central to his argument is
the conception of "voting strength" and the correlative criteria that inform
statutory-based conceptions of vote dilution." It is within this conception of
voting strength that Justice Thomas argued that the Court's voting rights
jurisprudence had gone awry." To this point, the opinion states: "In
construing the Act to cover claims of vote dilution, we have converted the
Act into a device for regulating, rationing, and apportioning political power
among racial and ethnic groups.""
The shift from access to impact and voting strength made the
effectiveness of the vote a crucial component of the Court's inquiry into vote
dilution claims."9 However, as the argument continued, in making
determinations of vote dilution, courts have immersed themselves in
determinations of voting strength, based in large part on the respective voting
power of minority groups vis-a-vis majority voters and with a clear focus on
the outcome of particular electoral policies and practices. 70 Given this, Justice
Thomas's opinion challenged what he identified as the impermissible
benchmark by which to judge the effectiveness of the vote namely, the
electoral result or control of the governing body.7 1 The concurrence
questioned the appropriate benchmark in the Court's assessment of vote
dilution claims given concerns about what constitutes an effective exercise
of the right to vote. 72 The discussion regarding the Court's preference for
single-member districts over at-large districting schemes reflects this
concern:

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 891.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id.
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The obvious advantage the Court has perceived in singlemember districts, of course, is there [sic] tendency to enhance the
ability of any numerical minority in the electorate to gain control of
seats in a representative body. But in choosing single-member
districting as a benchmark electoral plan on that basis the Court has
made a political decision and, indeed a decision that itself depends
.

.

on a prior political choice . .

Embedded in this critique is a challenge to what Justice Thomas, joined
by Justice Scalia, identified as the standard for measuring undiluted voting
strength-proportional racial representation:
But "how many" is the critical issue. Once one accepts the
proposition that the effectiveness of votes is measured in terms of
the control of seats, the core of any vote dilution claim is an
assertion that the group in question is unable to control the "proper"
number of seats-that is, the number of seats that the minority's
percentage of the population would enable it to control in the
benchmark "fair" system. The claim is inherently based on ratios
between the numbers of the minority in the population and the
numbers of seats controlled.
Justice Thomas contends that the remedy for impact-based vote dilution
claims would invariably involve a resort to proportional racial representation,
as well as essentialist views regarding minority and non-minority voters and
their voting choices.7 Justice Thomas argued that the underlying assumption
of vote dilution claims, which were based on the notion that the undiluted
vote mandates proportional representation, was therefore inflicted with the
taint of classifications based on race.
Because proportional race
representation embodied the assumption that all members from a particular
minority group think and vote alike, the remedy for impact-based vote
dilution claims presented a direct affront to the anti-classification norms

73. Id. The influence versus control debate is largely reflected in Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft, discussed in greater detail below.
Congress, however, rejected this view, in the 2006 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act.
74. Id. at 902.
75. Id. at 903.
76. Id. at 907.
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embedded within the Equal Protection Clause and an affront to individual
dignity.7 7 Furthermore, as the argument goes, to determine voting strength,

voters must be assigned to either the minority group or the majority group
and this proves disruptive in an increasingly diverse society by creating
fractures along racial lines." In their quest to determine the statutory
protections afforded to minorities voters in terms of their voting strength,
Justice Thomas maintained, courts had segregated voters and contributed to
the "racial 'balkaniz[ation]' of the Nation."7 9
The Ricci v. DeStefano case provides a more recent and in-depth analysis
of how disputes and consternation over disparate impact analysis play out in
the courts.8 () In Ricci, white firefighters filed suit challenging the city of New
Haven's decision to discard the test scores for a promotional exam. 8 ' New
Haven defended its actions on the grounds that the failure to do so would
have exposed it to disparate impact liability under Title VIL. 8 2 In a 5-4
opinion, the Court held that the city of New Haven violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by throwing out the test scores for the white
firefighters because the City lacked a "strong basis in evidence" 1 that its
failure to act would have violated the disparate impact provisions of Title VII.
Without meeting that heightened showing, the actions by the City in
discarding those test scores constituted disparate treatment. 84

77. Id. at 904.
78. Id. at 905.
79. Id. at 892.
80. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009).
81. Id. at 562.
82. See id. at 563. This disparate impact provision of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reads as follows:
(1) (A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact
is established under this title only if-(i) a complaining party demonstrates
that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity;
or (ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2012).
83. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584.
84. Id. at 593.
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The Supreme Court's opinion Ricci incited a flurry of responses from
the legal academy.` Of particular focus here is Justice Scalia's widely
discussed concurrence where he states in formidable fashion that there is
tension between Title VlI's disparate impact provisions and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Although the case was
decided pursuant to Title VII, the tension between disparate impact and equal
protection is one that may have direct consequences in the area of voting
rights, as some scholars have already noted."

85. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Is Integration A DiscriminatoryPrpose?. 96
IOWA L. REv. 837, 837-84 (2011): Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn
in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 955-1006 (2012): Mark
S. Brodin, Ricci v. Deste/ano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Triumph of
White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 161, 161-232 (2011): Cheryl 1.
Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 73-165 (2010); Kenneth L. Marcus, The
War Between DisparateImpact and Equal Protection,2008-09 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
53, 53-83; Michael Selimi, UnderstandingDiscriminationin a "Post-Racial" World,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 833-55 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindnessto
Antibalkanization: ,4n Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120
YALE L. J. 1278, 1278-1366 (2011); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate
Impact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1341-1387 (2010), Michael .1. Zimmer, Ricci's
"Color-Blind" Standard in A Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended
Consequences?, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257, 1257-1307 (2010).
86. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
87. See, e.g.. Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of/Disparate Vote Denial,
54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 586-88 (2013); Michael C. Dorf, Federal Governmental
Power: The Voting Rights Act, 26 TOURO L. REV. 505, 512 (2010) ("According to
Justice Scalia's concurrence in the Ricci case, not only do constitutional equality
norms permit disparate impact without discriminatory purpose, the prohibition of
disparate impact may itself be unconstitutional."); Michael K. Grimaldi, Disparate
Impact After Ricci and Lewis, 14 SCHOLAR 165, 214-15 (2011) (noting that statutes
incorporating disparate impact provisions, such as Voting Rights Act, would be
called into question after Ricci); Roger Klegg, The PFuture of the Voting Rights Act
after Bartlett and NAMUDNO, 2008-09 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 39 (noting
constitutional issues raised by disparate impact provisions under Voting Rights Act
and prohibitions on race-based actions only under the Fifteenth Amendment);
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Inpact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 496 n.15 (2003) ("The recognition that disparate impact
standards are constitutionally problematic would destabilize a range of federal laws
besides Title VII, including . . . the Voting Rights Act . . . .").
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Justice Scalia frames his concurrence as centered on the question of
"[w]hether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII
. . . consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection?" 88 In
addressing this question, Justice Scalia first argued that "remedial' racebased"" actions may constitute disparate treatment not only when a disparate
impact violation under Title VII would not result, but when the statute
"permits but affirmatively requires" such an action where a disparate
impact violation could be established. Embedded within Justice Scalia's
concurrence are critiques based on the anti-classification principle of equal
protection. 9 ' When the government acts based on the racial outcomes of its
programs or policies,9

the government is effectively classifying citizens on

the basis of race and making assumptions about individuals in those groups
in a process that facilitates and encourages essentialization of minority and
non-minority citizens alike and therefore presents an affront to the dignity of
the individual.
As will be explained in greater detail below, Ricci and Hall are situated
within a larger context-namely, courts increasing discomfort with the use
of forms of disparate impact liability, such as the results test under the Voting
Rights Act, as a mechanism for both identifying, or smoking out, illicit forms
of intentional racial discrimination operating within political, social, and
economic systems. However, most troubling is the fact that courts are
demonstrating a reluctance to draw the inference of discriminatory intent
even when disproportionate racial impact is accompanied by circumstantial
evidence of discrimination. In the vote dilution context, as stated above, this
reluctance is due in part to the notion that such claims seem to require courts
to engage in ad hoc determinations of the voting behaviors of minority and
non-minority groups. Yet, as will be explained below in greater detail, these
concerns over essentialism are not present in cases challenging the more
recent forms of vote denial.

88. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 594-95.
92. See id.at 594 ("Title VII's disparate-impact provisions place a racial
thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of
their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.").
93. Id.
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WHY OBJECTIONS TO IMPACT-BASED CLAIMS ARE MISPLACED IN
CASES CHALLENGING THE NEW FORMS OF VOTE DENIAL

The tense disputes over vote dilution challenges center on the content of
the claim (e.g., what exactly is the harm that vote dilution protects against),
the nature of the right (e.g., is the right an individual one or group-based),
and the scope of protections to remedy violations of that right (e.g., resultsbased tests, or totality of the circumstances).94 As will be argued below, the
most recent set of vote denial challenges present a distinct set of issues that
have not been adequately explored by the courts, although some voting rights
scholars have acknowledged and explored this point.' Before exploring the
differences in the issues at stake in vote denial claims as compared to impactbased vote dilution claims, it is important to first outline the objections to
vote dilution challenges. Although scholars have noted that the objections to
Section 2 vote dilution claims do not apply to more recent versions of voter
qualifications and elections policies that restrict access to the ballot-the socalled new vote denial - there is little in-depth discussion on precisely why
these challenges are unsuitable in the vote denial context. Yet, for the reasons
discussed below, ordinary disparate impact analysis and the critiques it
engenders in the vote dilution context is ill suited in the vote denial context.
Two points merit mention at the onset. First, vote dilution claims are a
necessary outgrowth of the successes made in eradicating the first-generation
barriers to the right to vote based on acts of intentional racism and violence.
These claims involve challenges to uphold the representational rights of
minority groups to participate in the political process and elect the candidates
of their choice." As voting rights scholars have argued, there is little (longterm) value in granting access to the ballot without the corresponding right to
convert that vote into mobilization opportunities for groups around
candidates, issue areas, policy concerns, and community needs, to name a
few interests." In this way, the validity and import of these types of claims
94. See, e.g., Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Rig/ht to Vote, 86
IND. L.J. 1289, 1293 (2011) (arguing that the new forms of vote denial implicate
individual rights as opposed to structural interests); Tokaji, supra note 15, at 691
(distinguishing vote denial from vote dilution claims).
95. See, e.g., Fishkin, supra note 94, at 1293; Tokaji, supra note 15. at 691.

96.
97.

Tokaji, sunra note 27, at 443.
Id.

98.

See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Sone Pessimism About

Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1712-13 (1993) ("The primary function of voting,
however, is not simply to delineate the boundaries of the political community.
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cannot be understated: vote dilution claims are an essential tool in the arsenal
of voting rights advocates concerned with democratic inclusion and
participation.
Second, it should be noted that the objections to vote dilution claims
under Section 2, for the most part, are focused on those claims construed as
challenging the impact of a particular election policy or practice"-for
example, a challenge based on the weight a minority vote is given under an
at-large election scheme as compared to the weight of a non-minority voteand not necessarily those claims challenging dilutionary policies adopted
with express discriminatory intent. Similarly, vote denial challenges can be
based either on intentional discrimination (for example, if a jurisdiction
adopted a voter ID law because it desired to reduce minority voting in its
district) or disproportional racial impact (for example, if a jurisdiction
enacted a proof of citizenship requirement to voting that had a disproportional
racial impact on a minority group and, when combined with social and
historical factors, would establish an inference of discrimination). 0(o Vote
denial challenges can incorporate direct evidence of intentional vote denial,
but by and large these challenges have been brought-through the
mechanism of Section 2's results test-to capture forms of intentional racial
discrimination that might seep into the electoral process undetected.'" 1
The most ardent critiques have attacked the results-based test under
Section 2 on the ground that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of Fifteenth
race-based
more
than
intentional
by
prohibiting
Amendment
discrimination, 102 or permitted race-based entitlements.10 3 There is, however,
extensive work by legal scholars to defend the constitutionality of Section
2-and, in particular, vote dilution challenges-as well as results-based

Rather it is to combine individual preferences to reach some collective decision,
such as the selection of representatives. Voting therefore involves aggregation, and
each voter has an interest in the adoption of aggregation rules that enable her to elect
the candidate of her choice.").
99. Tokaji, supra note 27, at 444.
100. Id. at 466.
101. Tokaji, supra note 15, at 701.
102. See, e.g., Klegg, supra note 87, at 39; Jennifer G. Presto, Note, The 1982
Arnendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Constitutionality After Citv of
Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 630 (2004) (discussing constitutional

tensions with Section 2 after Boerne).
103. See general/v ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT 453
(1987);

THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS-AND WRONGS: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR

RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 11, 2-3.
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"

claims. 10 4 The vast majority of the scholarship focuses on ways to
10 These defenses of Section 2 emphasize
conceptualize vote dilution claims.o
the rights of minorities within the American model of majoritarian, winnertake all politics."
Despite the extensive scholarship proposing frameworks for
conceptualizing vote dilution claims, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate
an opinion on the precise injury that vote dilution protects against, prompting
one scholar to propose a test for removing "vote dilution" as a concept from

104. Tokaji, supra note 27, at 455.
105. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted

Vote, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1663, 1666-67 (2001) ("This Article therefore offers a new
conceptual framework for understanding what makes dilution claims special and for
adapting traditional doctrinal structures to such claims. It does so by identifying and
closely analyzing the special nature of the injury in question. What makes dilution
claims unusual is that the individual injury at issue cannot be proved without
reference to the status of the group as a whole; no individual can assert that her vote
has been diluted unless she can prove that other members of her group have been
distributed unfairly within the districting scheme. Because all of these features stem
from the unique injury underlying dilution claims-in which individual injury arises
from the aggregate treatment of group members-I call rights that share these
characteristics 'aggregate rights.'"); Lani Guinicr, (E)racing Democracv: The
Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REv. 109, 113 (1994) ("The goals of the Act can
and should be defended by framing them philosophically within a theory of group
representation. The premise of such an approach is that group representation, as a
matter of democratic theory, is not about race but about democratic political
community. Because of the confluence of historical discrimination and
contemporary exclusion, racial and language minority groups enjoy an exclusive
right under the Act to establish a legal violation. Once a violation has been proved,
however, the most acceptable way to empower the particular plaintiff class would
be to move to a broader conception of group representation based on interests rather
than race."); Karlan, supra note 98, at 1740 (The Supreme Court often speaks as if
there were a single framework for assessing voting rights claims. I show, however,
that the Court's cases reflect three discrete, yet ultimately linked, conceptions of
voting. First, voting involves participation: the formal ability of individuals to enter
into the electoral process by casting a ballot. Second, voting involves aggregation:
the choice among rules for tallying individual votes to determine election outcomes.
Finally, voting involves governance: It serves a key role in determining how
decision-making by elected representatives will take place.).
106. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1592-94

(1993).
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the ambit of Section 2 entirely.' 0 7 As such, the critiques of Section 2 remain
a prominent feature of conservative popular commentary.'" Moreover, the
constitutional challenges levied against impact-based vote dilution
challenges are a serious concern and require a reformulation of these claims
by courts lest the constitutional challenges prevail.' 0 9
That said, closer analysis of the interests at stake in vote denial
challenges reveal that the objections to impact-based vote dilution are
misplaced in challenges involving access to the ballot, even if
disproportionate racial impact forms an essential component of the vote
denial claim. Stated differently, whatever concerns are animating critiques of
disparate impact-like claims in the vote dilution context, they are simply not
convincing in the vote denial context. This section will discuss each of the
objections to vote dilution challenges in turn by focusing on the constitutional
and statutory-based challenges to these types of claims and demonstrate how
the basis for the objections in the vote dilution context cannot be properly
applied to the new forms of vote denial.
A. Objections Pursuantto the Equal Protection Clause

Theoretical challenges to impact-based vote dilution claims based on the
Equal Protection Clause are grounded in two main claims: First, jurisdictions
seeking to avoid vote dilution challenges and meet their statutory obligations
under the Voting Rights Act are required to engage in unjustified forms of
race-based decision-making, focused on the racial outcomes of elections, but
lacking a compelling state interest' 1o; and second, vote dilution claims
classify voters on the basis of race and represent an affront to individual
dignity. 11

107. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: OfBiased
Votes, UnconstitutionalElections, and Conunon Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
377, 381-84 (2012).
108. See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT'?,

supra note 103; ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS - AND
WRONGS, supra note I1; Klegg, supra note 87, at 35-5 1; Presto, supra note 102, at
609-631.
109. See, e.g., Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 109, at 37983 (discussing constitutional disputes involving vote dilution challenges under
Section 2); Gerken, supra note 105, at 1665 (noting that the Supreme Court's "highly
individualist notion of rights in Shaw v. Hunt portends a serious constitutional
battlc").
I 10. Elmendorf, supra note 109, at 388.
111. Id. at 404.
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With respect to the first challenge, critics argue that vote dilution claims
at most require-or at least encourage-unjustifiable race-based decisionmaking in that the claims are oriented towards the racialized outcomes, or
race-based predictions, of electoral systems and procedures. 112 For example,
in Bartlett, officials from Pender County, North Carolina challenged the
action by the North Carolina General Assembly to split the county into two
state House districts, violating the "Whole County Provision" of the North
Carolina State Constitution that prevented "the General Assembly from
dividing counties when drawing legislative districts for the State House and
Senate."'' 3 The state officials raised Section 2 as a defense and the district
court held for the defendants on the grounds that, "although AfricanAmericans were not a majority of the voting-age population in District 18,
the district was a 'de facto' majority-minority district because AfricanAmericans could get enough support from crossover majority voters to elect
their preferred candidate."I 14 In other words, although the minority plaintiffs
did not constitute a numerical majority of the jurisdiction, a precondition
under the Gingles test, these voters could align themselves with crossover
majority voters to elect the candidate of their choice. On appeal, the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.'' In
reaching its conclusion that a numerical majority was required to satisfy the
first prong of the Gingles factors for vote dilution claims, the court reasoned
as follows:

.

Determining whether a § 2 claim would lie-i.e., determining
whether potential districts could function as crossover districtswould place courts in the untenable position of predicting many
political variables and tying them to race-based assumptions. .
There is an underlying principle of fundamental importance: We
must be most cautious before interpreting a statute to require courts
to make inquiries based on racial classifications and race-based
predictions. The statutory mandate petitioners urge us to find in § 2
raise serious constitutional questions.' 16

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 7 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 17-18.
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The majority's opinion reveals a clear aversion to vote dilution claims to
the extent that these claims require race-based decision-making centered on
assumptions regarding the political behaviors of minority and non-minority
voters. At the same time, although the Court's holding was limited to the
precise question of whether minority voters could assert a vote dilution claim
without constituting a majority of the jurisdiction,'" there is nothing to
suggest that implications for vote dilution or other types of impact-based
claims are similarly limited to the facts of that case. For one, Justices Scalia
and Thomas concurred in the opinion to reiterate their view from the Hall
case that impact-based vote dilution claims were not authorized under Section
2-a concurrence that not only challenged dilution claims based on statutory
interpretation and legislative history, but also included the constitutional
challenge that these vote dilution suits require or permit race-based decisionmaking by jurisdictions in determining the appropriate means for allocating
political power among racial groups.'" Second, Justice Scalia's concurrence
in Ricci offers a similar version of this critique in the Title VII context.'' In
the vote dilution context, aversion to vote dilution claims is in part based on
the conception of these claims as placing the proverbial thumb on the scale
to determine the racial impact of the particular election policy or practice on
the election outcome namely, the composition of the governing body.120
Although the facts change and the contexts differ, the common thread in these
critiques is that disparate impact-like claims, including vote dilution, may
require or encourage unjustified race-based decision making.
In a similar vein, some critics of vote dilution claims have argued that
such claims trample upon the dignity of the individual by classifying or
categorizing voters into racial groups. 12 ' According to the argument, the harm
117. Id. at 17-18.
I18. See Hall, 512 U.S. at 905 ("As a result, Gingles' requirement of proof of
political cohesiveness, as practically applied, has proved little different from a
working assumption that racial groups can be conceived of largely as political
interest groups. And operating under that assumption, we have assigned federal
courts the task of ensuring that minorities are assured their 'just' share of seats in
elected bodies throughout the Nation.").
1 19. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594-96.
120. Versions of this argument appear within Section 5 case law as well. See,
e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Williams, J.,
dissenting) ("The amended § 5 thus not only mandates race-conscious decision
making, but a particular brand of it. In doing so, the new § 5 aggravates both the
federal-state tension with which Northwest Austin was concerned and the tension
between § 5 and the Reconstruction Amendments' commitment to
nondiscrimination.").
12 1. Id.
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befalls minorities and non-minorities alike in that it balkanizes' 2 2 the nation
along racial lines, and moves the polity "toward racially separate electorates,"
despite the fact that "progress toward political integration is substantial." 23
However, the new forms of vote denial do not affront principles
affirming individual dignity because these claims do not require courts to
engage in ad hoc race-based decision-making or race-based predictions and,
more to the point, do not incite essentialist views on how minority groups and
non-minority groups will or will not vote in upcoming elections. For instance,
imagine that plaintiffs in a jurisdiction want to challenge a voter ID law that
requires voters to show photographic proof of identity. Plaintiffs challenging
a voter ID law under Section 2 would have to show that minority voters are
disproportionately (and adversely) affected by this requirement, or more
specifically, that these voters are disproportionately unable to procure the
required forms of identification. The inability to procure the necessary forms
of identification could be attributed to the inability to afford the required
documents establishing identity in order to obtain the official state
identification, which is itself attributable to the disparities in purchasing
power in the community that might be a product of racialized poverty patterns
within the jurisdiction.' 2 4 In the end, the challenged policy has resulted in an
increased likelihood of disenfranchisement-or, an unequal opportunity to
participate in the political process for these minority voters. In support of
their claim, the plaintiffs would not need to show that the minority voters
voted a certain way or for a particular candidate or for a particular set of
issues. Rather, the plaintiffs would have to show that minority voters were
disproportionately rendered ineligible-disenfranchised-at higher rates that
non-minority voters, resulting in lower voter turnout on election day and that
122. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
&

123. Timothy G. O'Rourke, The 1982 Amendnents and the Voting Rights
Paradox, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 85, 108 (Bernard Grofman
Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992).
124. For another version of the same type of legal challenge, see Tokaji, supra
note 17, at 360-61 ("The argument would go something like this: (1) de jurc
discrimination in public education, along with discrimination by public employers,
led to unequal access to job opportunities; (2) those unequaljob opportunities in turn
led to lower rates of automobile ownership among blacks, which persist to this day;

(3) because black citizens are less likely to drive, they are less likely to possess a
driver's license than white citizens; and (4) given that blacks are less likely to have
a driver's license, the most common form of government-issued photo ID, they will

be affected more severely by laws that condition voting on possession of such
identification.").
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the disenfranchisement can be accurately attributed to the voter ID law.
Furthermore, provided that the plaintiffs meet their showing under Section 2,
a reviewing court in deciding the remedy would be required to determine
whether there are reasonable justifications for the policy to be offered by the
jurisdiction and, if not, must determine whether the policy should be modified
or repealed. At no point is the court required to engage in race-based
assumptions or essentialism and at no point is the remedy of proportional
racial representation even a consideration.
Although challenges to the new forms of vote denial make reference to
the disproportional racial impact of certain voting qualifications and policies
on certain protected groups, the core of injury is the denial of the individual
voter's right to vote in a manner than may evince racially discriminatory
intent. 125 This is not to suggest, however, that these newer forms of vote
denial must be assessed by either focusing exclusively on either the
individual's right to vote or the minority group's right to representation,
because the two frameworks operate in tandem. The right to vote involves
both the individual right to vote as well as the right of voters to aggregate
their collective votes to pursue and achieve political goals:
In reframing the conception of the right to vote, liberals should
also build upon the emerging recognition that the fundamental right
to vote, while it is an important symbol of an individual's full
membership in our political community, is a structural/aggregative
right as well as an individual one. Voting is instrumental: It
determines how political power gets allocated. If punitive offender
disenfranchisement statutes bar over one million African Americans
from voting, their disenfranchisement is not just their own business:
It deprives the black community as a whole of political power and
can skew election results sharply to the right, creating legislative
bodies hostile to civil rights and economic justice for the franchised
and disenfranchised alike.1 26
That said, emphasizing the salience of the individual right at stake in
these new forms of vote denial shifts the frame through which these claims
are assessed by re-affirming "that the individual right to vote matters, in
significant part, for reasons that are not reducible to structural values ... [and]
that the individual right to vote is valuable for reasons that cannot be fully
125. See O'Rourke, supra note 123, at 85, 108.
126. Pamela S. Karlan, The Reconstruction of Voting Rights, in

RACE,
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

34, 41 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al., eds. 2011).
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captured by broader, structural variables such as the overall level of
participation, representativeness, democratic accountability .... "127
B. ConsternationOver ProportionalRepresentationas the Remed

.

The Supreme Court first recognized vote dilution claims as actionable
under the Voting Rights Act in Allen i. State Board of Elections.12 8 The
question then became: by what standards should courts use to measure or
compare the diluted vote with the undiluted vote?' 2 " Following Allen, the
Supreme Court began to elaborate on the standard by which plaintiffs could
establish vote dilution claims under the Equal Protection Clause." In the
cases that followed, the Court was clear to announce that electoral schemes
producing a disparate racial impact, whether at-large or multimember, were
not per se unconstitutional.'-' Instead the Court stated that the plaintiffs
would have to demonstrate that the scheme, "designedly or otherwise . .
operate[d] to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population." 13 1
Further elaborating on the plaintiff s showing for constitutional dilution
claims, the Court emphasized in Whitcomb v. Chavis that the aim of the
Reconstruction Amendments was to combat "purposeful devices to further
racial discrimination" and that in the present case the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate that the challenged devices "were conceived or operated as
purposeful devices to further racial or economic discrimination."' 33 In
Whitcomb, the plaintiffs had specifically challenged Indiana's multimember
districting scheme on the grounds that it impermissibly diluted the vote of
African Americans residing in urban enclaves, or "ghetto[s]."' 4 Reversing
the district court's finding of vote dilution, the Court articulated the following
as the plaintiffs required showing:

127. Fishkin, supra note 94, at 1296.
128. Allen v. State Bd. Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569-71 (1969).
129. David P. Van Knapp, Diluting E/fect Qf Minorities' Votes hv Adoption of
ParticularElection Plan, or Gerrynanderingof Election District, as Violation of
Equal Protection Clause ofFederalConstitution, 27 A.L.R FED. 29, *2b (originally
published in 1976).
130. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142-44 (1971).
131. See id. at 142.

132. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
133. Whitconb, 403 U.S. at 148-49.
134. Id. at 128-29.
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Nor does the fact that the number of ghetto residents who were
legislators was not in proportion to ghetto population satisfactorily
prove invidious discrimination absent evidence and findings that
ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other Marion County
residents to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice."
This passage from the Court's opinion is particularly important for two
reasons: first, a portion of the passage forms the basis by which plaintiffs can
now prove a violation under Section 2; 136 and second, it articulated the
earliest and most emphatic rejections of impact only claims that is, a claim
based on the fact that the percentage of minority voters in the jurisdiction is
disproportionate to the percentage of minority elected officials-on the
grounds that recognizing such claims would effectively require entitlements
to proportional representation.'1 7 Without evidence of something more than
disproportional racial impact, a factfinder could not draw the inference of
discriminatory intent. 13' The references in Whitcomb v. Chavis,13 ' and later
4 " reflect early concerns about the use of proportional
in Connor v. Finch,o
representation as a benchmark for measuring and remedying vote dilution
claims.
In White v. Regester, the Court upheld the district court's adoption of a
"totality of the circumstances" test as guide for judges in assessing vote

135. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
136. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012).
137. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 6, at 32 ("[W]as the absence of minorities
from legislative bodies the result of racial discrimination as such, or did it stem from
such extraneous factors as the unpopularity of Democratic candidates in a
Republican stronghold'? If it were the latter, then to require a remedy that guaranteed
safe seats to blacks, as the trial court had ordered, might be taken to imply that any
group whose interests were unrepresented in a legislative assembly had a
constitutional claim to proportional representation.").
138. Id. at 32-33.
139. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 148-49 ("Nor does the fact that the number of
ghetto residents who were legislators was not in proportion to ghetto population
satisfactorily prove invidious discrimination absent evidence and findings that
ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other Marion County residents to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.").
140. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1977) (citing Whitcomh, 403 U.S.
at 149-55) ("But I do not think that the plan improperly dilutes black voting strength
just because it fails to provide proportional representation.").

120

Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol 9.1

dilution claims.1 4 1 Specifically, the assessment would allow courts to
determine social and historical factors, including the challenged electoral
procedure or device, which contributed to minorities having "less opportunity
than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes
and to elect legislators of their choice."1 4 2 The Court provided little guidance
on what factors would comprise the totality of the circumstances test other
than noting the "cultural and economic realities"-but lower courts,
including most notably the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, provided a
comprehensive list of factors that could inform the courts totality of the
circumstances analysis. 143 After White v. Regester, the number of challenges
to vote dilution schemes brought by minority plaintiffs increased, encouraged
in part by the breadth of evidence permissible under White's totality of
circumstances approach. 144
By the time the Supreme Court decided City of Mobile v. Boldeni , the
concern that proportionate representation would serve as the benchmark for
impact-based vote dilution claims had become explicit. In Bolden, the Court
scaled back the test for vote dilution, limiting the scope of protections under
the Fifteenth Amendment-and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which
tracked its language-to intentional race discrimination.'14 6 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court emphasized that it had never suggested that the
Constitution supported a guarantee to proportional representation 47 or that
claims based on the "discriminatory impact of the statute"'14 were sufficient
to state a vote dilution claim.
Outraged by the heightened evidentiary burden the intent showing would
impose on plaintiffs, the civil rights community launched a lobbying
campaign to amend Section 2 to incorporate a new test that would undo the
impact of Bolden, thereby setting the stage for a political battle with the newly

141. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973) ("Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the District Court evolved its ultimate assessment of the
multimember district, overlaid, as it was, on the cultural and economic realities of
the Mexican-American community in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest
of the county.").
142. Id. at 766 (citing Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-50).
143. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).
144. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 37.
145. Id. at 32, 37-38.
146. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-62 (1980).
147. See id. at 79.
148. Id. at 99.
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elected President Reagan and his conservative cabinet. 14 9 Thus, it was not
surprising that Congress's focus in the months leading up to the 1982
authorization was on vote dilution. Tense debates on the question of whether
and how to ensure that the "results test" did not confer a right to proportional
racial representation threatened to derail the efforts to amend Section 2 to
incorporate a test not based on a showing of intentional discrimination.' 5 0 In
the end, a compromise, orchestrated by Senator Bob Dole, was struck,
repudiating any entitlement to proportional racial representation. ' The Dole
Compromise did not, however, resolve the tension between discriminatory
impacts or discriminatory effects and the entitlement to proportional racial
representation as a remedy.15 2 As one jurist noted, "the tension between an
impact-based test of lawfulness and a rejection of a right to proportional
representation defies easy resolution."' 3
Similarly, the plurality opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles'5 4 the first
Supreme Court case to construe the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights
Act-also did little to resolve the tension between the impact-based results
test as a basis for liability and the rejection of the remedy of proportional
representation. Despite clear statements by Justice Brennan, writing for a
plurality, that the Court's new test for vote dilution claims did not create such
an entitlement, '" the problematic specter of "proportionate representation"
did indeed arise again. Since Gingles, several Justices have presumed this

149. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 38. One commentator has noted that the
effect of Bolden was "dramatic." Because of the plaintiffs onerous burden of proof,
litigation challenging discriminatory voting practices under the Constitution and
Section 2 dried up. See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of'Section 2 and
Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 67 (Bernard
Grofman & Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992).
150. Thomas M. Boyd and Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the

Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1392
(1983).
151. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301(b) (2012) ("[N]othing in this section establishes
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.").

152. See Boyd and Markman, supra note 150, at 1414-15.
153. Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Higginbotham, J., concurring).

154. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 30.
155. See id. at 46 (citations omitted) ("[T]he conjunction of an allegedly
dilutive electoral mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone does

not establish a violation.").
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baseline in vote dilution claims and by doing so have called into question the
entire constitutionality of Section 2.Y
In her concurrence in Gingles, Justice O'Connor argued that the
plurality' s test1 57 for vote dilution claims under Section 2 effectively
sanctioned-and affirmatively required-proportionate representation for
minority groups. " This was now the adopted standard by which, the
concurring justices argued, vote dilution claims were to be measured.
Justice O'Connor grounded her opinion in the tension that although
"Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under §2 ...
Congress did not intent to create a right to proportional representation for
minority voters." 1uo Because the plurality in Gingles tied the standard by
which to measure vote dilution claims that is, the undiluted vote-to the
ability to elect candidates of the minority group's choosing, the plurality had

156. See Hall, 512 U.S. at 902-03 (Thomas. 1., concurring in part).
157. In Gingles, the Court set forth the showing for vote dilution claims under

Section 2:
These circumstances are necessary preconditions for multimember
districts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to elect
representatives of their choice for the following reasons. First, the minority
group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district. If it is not, as would be the case in a substantially integrated
district, the multi-meinmber jbrin of the district cannot be responsible for
minority voters' inability to elect its candidates... Second, the minority
group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the minority
group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a
multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group
interests. . .. Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special
circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed .

.

. to

defeat the minority's preferred candidate.
In establishing this last
circumstance, the minority group demonstrates that submergence in a
white multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen
representatives.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (citations omitted).

158. Ic/ at 87-88.
159. Id.

160. Ic. at 84.
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in effect established an entitlement to proportional representation. Justice
O'Connor summarized her argument as follows:
The Court's statement of the elements of a vote dilution claim
also supplies an answer to another question posed above: how mitch
of an impairment of undiluted minority voting strength is necessary
to prove vote dilution. The Court requires the minority group that
satisfies the threshold requirements of size and cohesiveness to
prove that it will usually be unable to elect as many representatives
of its choice under the challenged districting scheme as its undiluted
voting strength would permit. This requirement, then, constitutes the
true test of vote dilution. Again, no reason appears why this test
would not be applicable to a vote dilution claim challenging singlemember as well as multimember districts.
This measure of vote dilution, taken in conjunction with the
Court's standard for measuring undiluted minority voting strength,
creates what amounts to a right to usual, roughly proportional
representation on the part of sizable, compact, cohesive minority
groups. If, under a particular multimember or single-member district
plan, qualified minority groups usually cannot elect the
representatives they would be likely to elect under the most
favorable single-member districting plan, then § 2 is violated.
Unless minority success under the challenged electoral system
regularly approximates this rough version of proportional
representation, that system dilutes minority voting strength and
violates § 2.'
In his concurrence in Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas reiterated similar
concerns, arguing that "the [Gingles] Court had adopted a rule of roughly
proportional representation...."162 Legal scholarship and popular
commentary have similarly supported this view, setting the stage for later
critiques challenging the constitutionality of Section 2 as a whole given this
formulation. `3 In a similar vein, some scholars have argued that the remedies
for vote dilution in practice require racial quotas.164
161. Id. at 91.
162. Hall, 512 U.S. at 903.
163. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the
Probleni of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV.
652, 657-59 (1993).
164. See Klegg, supra note 87, at 39 ("Second, if the action is valuable enough,
then surreptitious-or not so surreptitious-racial quotas will be adopted so that the
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However, challenges based on the notion that impact-based vote dilution
claims require or permit proportional representation as a baseline for
measuring the injury and as a basis for relief are inapplicable in the vote
denial context. First, vote denial claims implicate individual denials of the
right to vote-participation harms plain and simple-and can be assessed
without reference to race-based assumptions or predictions about the voting
choices of minority groups. 6 5 Second, the remedy for the vote denial is the
repeal of the discriminatory policy."' As such, there is no dispute over the
baseline or appropriate standard for determining whether and how the denial
should be remedied. Third, vote denial claims do not implicate proportional
representation concerns regarding the composition of governing bodies, but
rather participation by the electorate.
Given that the concerns and objections to disparate impact analysis in
the vote dilution context read very differently in the vote denial context, how
are courts assessing these claims? As the following sections will demonstrate,
the objections to disparate impact analysis in the vote dilution context have
spilled over into the vote denial context revealing inconsistencies in the ways
courts evaluate these claims, and most importantly, demonstrating the
barriers to plaintiffs challenging these newer forms of vote denial.

action is no longer racially disparate in its impact."). See also Tokaji, supra note 11,
at 705 (citation omitted) ("Future Chief Justice John Roberts, then a lawyer in the
Justice Department, also made this argument in a memorandum asserting that the
results test 'would establish essentially a quota system for electoral politics."').
165. See, e.g., Fishkin, supra note 94, at 1309-10 ("The most basic argument
against the anti-fraud measures is that they disenfranchise legitimate voters by
burdening or violating their individual right to vote. Of course, groups also have an
interest in protecting their members from disenfranchisement; the polity as a whole
has an interest in safeguarding the rights of its members. But these interests are
derivative of the individual voters' interests. As individuals attempt to vote, they
succeed or fail one by one. Their right to vote does not rise or fall with the treatment
of the group (or the polity as a whole), nor is it unindividuated among members of
the group (or the polity).").
166. Department of Justice, About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The

Shelby County Decision, https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rightsact (Aug 8, 2015).
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HEIGHTENED EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL
CASES

This section will demonstrate that efforts to apply vote dilution tests to
vote denial claims obscure the complexity of issues presented in present day
voting rights challenges. It will describe how disputes regarding the
constitutionality of disparate impact-like claims in the vote dilution context
have prevented the recognition of vote denial claims that are permitted by the
text of the statute as well as relief for plaintiffs under that provision. Versions
of the critiques presented in the vote dilution context-critiques of which
implicate disparate impact theory more generally appear in the vote denial
context. In some cases, courts are reluctant to recognize vote denial claims
based in part on disproportionate racial impact and reject these claims, citing
objections from the vote dilution context. 167
The spillover effects of the debates and critiques from the vote dilution
context have direct consequences for plaintiffs pursuing claims alleging vote
denial. 1 8 In cases where courts have failed to recognize such claims, three
distinct barriers to relief emerge: (1) the characterization of such claims as
"impact only" by reviewing courts; (2) the heightened causal showing
required of plaintiffs bringing vote denial claims; and (3) the inability of
courts to develop standards for determining whether race-based disparities
are significant.""
A. "Impact Oniv " Claims and the Looming Presence ofProportional
Representation
After the Supreme Court's ruling in Bolden, Congress amended Section
2 to incorporate a results test.17 () By so doing, Congress removed the

167. See Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249-1250 (M.D. Fla.
2012).
168. Section 2 vote denial claims are filed much less frequently than vote
dilution claims and the vast majority of Section 2 claims allege vote dilution. See
Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 (2012) (noting that vote denial cases are frequent);
Smith v. Commonwealth of Virginia, No. CIV.A. 3:08CV800, 2009 WL 2175759
at *6 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2009) (noting that the majority of Section 2 claims are vote
dilution claims).
169. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 624 F.3d 1162 at 1192-94.
170. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012) ("No voting qualification . .. shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color ....
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requirement that plaintiffs prove intentional discrimination and allowed
plaintiffs to meet their showing by demonstrating that the challenged practice
resulted in discriminatory effects.1 7 1 Although Congress did not specify
whether Section 2 vote dilution claims incorporated a results test that required
"something more than effect,"17 2 since the 1982 Amendments courts have
consistently read the results test requirement to require something more than
a statistical showing of disparate impact. 173 Lower courts reasoned that
Congress's decision to restore the meaning of Section 2 to the pre-Bolden
case law meant that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 2, decided
in the context of vote dilution cases, controlled.1 7 4 In vote dilution cases
decided pre-Bolden, courts required something more than disparate impact to
establish a claim.'7 " Following the 1982 Amendments, in Gingles the Court
interpreted Section 2 to require that the plaintiff show something more than
disproportionate racial impact and the existence of the alleged dilutionary
scheme the plaintiff had to prove that the scheme caused the
disproportionate impact and when coupled with historical and social

171. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of State of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1227
(1 Ith Cir. 2005) (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1991)) (footnotes
omitted) ("Recognizing the subtle ways that states often denied racial minorities the
right to vote, in 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act so that
a plaintiff could establish a violation without proving discriminatory intent. Thus, it
is well-settled that a plaintiff can challenge voting qualifications under a 'results'
test.").
172. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, George T. Conway Ill, Kenneth K. Lee, The Case
Against Felon Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 9 (2008) ("There is
absolutely no indication in the legislative history of the 1982 amendments of the
Voting Rights Act that the introduction of the word 'results' was intended to create
a simple disparate impact test."). But see Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1241 n.2 (1Ith Cir.

2005) (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Congress could have
specified in § 2 that some of the White factors were strongly probative of intent, and
that proof of 'something more than effect' was the sine qua non of a § 2 claim,
regardless of whether the proof was direct or indirect.").
173. See Detzner, 895 F. Supp.2d at 1249 n.14.
174. See, e.g.,Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1237 (Tjoflat, J. concurring) (citing 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N at 192) ("The proposed amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act is designed to restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination
cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden."). Furthermore, Congress
incorporated into its revised Section 2 language directly from a Supreme Court vote

dilution case. Regester, 412 U.S. at 755.
175. See 52 U.S.C.

§ 10301(a) (2012).
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conditions interacted with the electoral system to result in unequal
opportunity for minority voters.1 7 6
Although courts have construed the results test as requiring impact-plus
in vote dilution cases where direct evidence of discriminatory intent is
lacking, courts have long been unwilling to recognize vote denial claims
based on a showing of simple disparate impact. 7 7 This is true despite the fact
that the question of whether impact alone may constitute a claim under
Section 2 remains unsettled.1 7 8 Not surprisingly, plaintiffs in earlier Section
2 vote denial cases fared better in challenges to election procedures and
policies with racially disparate impacts, in cases where the policies were
selectively (and discriminatorily) enforced, or where there was extensive
evidence of explicit racial hostility towards minorities. 7 1 Shelby Countv's

.

176. See Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) ("First, electoral devices, such as atlarge elections, may not be considered per se violative of § 2. Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, the devices result in
unequal access to the electoral process. Second, the conjunction of an allegedly
dilutive electoral mechanism and the lack of proportional representation alone does
not establish a violation. Third, the results test does not assume the existence of
racial bloc voting; plaintiffs must prove it.") (citations omitted).
177. See, e.g., Texas Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential
Candidates v. Strake, 511 F. Supp. 149, 155 (S.D. Tex. 1981) ("Plaintiffs allege that
certain blacks and Mexican-Americans have been denied full pardons solely because
of their race or national origin, and thus they are unable to vote. They seem to
contend that this discriminatory denial is a violation of. . . the Voting Rights Act .
.. These three plaintiffs do not fall within the class of persons [the Act] was designed
to protect.").
178. See, e.g., Sinnons, 575 F.3d at 35 n.10 ("Whether a claim of mere
disproportionality alone supports a 'resulting' claim is not clear under § 2 and is a
difficult question we need not reach."); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 n.30 ("[T]he deep
division among eminent judicial minds on this issue demonstrates that the text of
Section 2 is unclear."); Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d. at 1249 ("However, despite this
lack of clarity, it appears that in the Eleventh Circuit a plaintiff must demonstrate
something more than disproportionate impact to establish a Section 2 violation.").
179. See, e.g., United States v. Saint Landry Par. Sch. Bd., 601 F.2d 859, 86667 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing district court's dismissal of section 2 violation where
the Fifth Circuit found the deceptive practices of poll workers assisting black voters
and preventing them from selecting the candidates of their choice constituted a
violation under the Voting Rights Act even where vote denial was not specifically
alleged in the complaint); Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1973)
(upholding district court's finding of Section 2 violation based on disproportionate
voter purge of African American voters), Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513,
1532 (E.D. Mo. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989)
(challenging Board's failure to review the rejected ballots of black voters); Coal. for
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rejection of past discrimination as a basis for congressional prophylactic
measures certainly places Section 2 in the Supreme Court's constitutional
crosshairs. "o That said, the heightened impact plus requirement in the vote
denial context appears linked to debates from the vote dilution context and,
in particular, reveal judicial reluctance to grant relief for claims perceived as
conferring entitlements to proportionate racial representation. 1 8
In a number of the new vote denial cases, claims classified as impact
only were

arguably not impact onlV claims. Disagreement

over the

interpretation of evidentiary standards under Section 2 vote denial claims has
led courts to re-characterize evidence of disparities inside the political
process, and external to it, as impact only claims.' " Impact only claims are
often characterized as such because courts reject alleged causal relationships,
for example, between the challenged policy and the disparity in the political
system,m or decline to infer a causal relationship or link between disparities
in the political sphere and the racial disparities outside of it.. 18 4 Moreover, the
totality of the circumstances test, which is the vehicle by which plaintiffs
Educ. Dist. One v. Bd. Elections of City of N.Y., 370 F. Supp. 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) aff"d, 495 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing evidence of racial hostility to
Black, Puerto Rican, and Chinese parents along with disparate impact).
180. She/lb Crv., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) ("To serve that
purpose, Congress-if it is to divide the States-must identify those jurisdictions to
be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot
rely simply on the past. We made that clear in Northwest Austin, and we make it
clear again today.")
181. See, e.g., Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1237-38 (citation omitted) (Tjotlat, J.,
concurring) ("Consistent with that intent, we have, as Judge Barkett suggests in her

dissent, applied section 2 in the vote denial context. Dismissing the vote-denial claim
in a cursory manner in that case, however, we did not pause to establish the minimum
requirements of a prima facie vote-denial claim under section 2, and the case is thus
of dubious precedential value, especially in support of the proposition that mere
disparate impact is sufficient to establish such a claim.... In short, nothing in Burton
requires us to return this case to the district court simply because Florida's felondisenfranchisement law disadvantages minorities out of proportion to their makeup
of the general population of the State."). Judge Tjoflat went on to argue that
additional support for his position could be found in 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b), which
expressly denied members of a protected class entitlement to proportionate
representation. Id. at 1238 n.6.
182. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405-06 (9th Cir. 2012).
183. Id. at 406.
184. See generally Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan11), 623 F.3d 990 (9th
Cir. 2010).
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establish violations of Section 2, does not specify the required evidentiary
showing sufficient to permit the factfinder to draw the interference of
causation.'1 5 Courts must weigh the factors under that test, but there is no
statement of what weight each factor must be given. Similarly, the Supreme
Court's articulation of the requirements in Gingles, requiring that the plaintiff
demonstrate how social and historical conditions interact with the challenged
voting qualification or election procedure to deny the right to vote,18 6
provides little guidance to courts on what can be considered enough of an
interaction to constitute causation.
Cases involving challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws present an
illuminating case study. In a series of cases, plaintiffs have challenged felon
disenfranchisement laws as impermissible vote denial under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.' 8 7 Section 2 claims challenging these laws are premised
on the disproportionate impact that these voting eligibility exclusions have
on minorities.' 8 These state laws violate Section 2, the argument goes,
because the laws disproportionately disenfranchise racial minorities who are
convicted and sentenced at higher rates than non-minorities. 9
In Farrakhanv. Gregoire,19 0 the Ninth Circuit retreated from its earlier
decision' 9 ' recognizing Section 2 challenges to felon disenfranchisement
laws. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs asserting Section 2 challenges to
these laws "must at least show that the criminal justice system is infected by
intentional discrimination or that the felon disenfranchisement law was
enacted with such intent." 192 Because they could not demonstrate "that the
law was enacted for the purpose of denying minorities the right to vote" or
that "their convictions and resulting disenfranchisement resulted from
185. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Wash.
1997), (commenting that there is little guidance in court precedent on what factors
are most salient in a Section 2 claim that challenges a felon disenfranchisement
statute).
186. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
187. Felon disenfranchisement laws have also been challenged on the grounds
that such laws impermissibly diluted the votes of African Americans as a group. See,
e.g., Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1257 (6th Cir. 1986).
188. See, e.g., Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260.
189. See Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1307 ("The Complaint alleges that
minorities are disproportionately prosecuted and sentenced, resulting in their
disproportionate representation among the persons disenfranchised under the
Washington Constitution.").
190. Farrakhan v. Gregoire (FarrakhanIII), 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010).
191. Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan1), 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010), on
reh'g en banc, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010).
192. FarrakhanIII, 623 F.3d at 993.
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intentional racial discrimination in the operation of the state's criminal justice
system,"193 the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. 19 4 In reaching its conclusion,
the Ninth Circuit was clear to note that statistical evidence of racial disparities
in the state's criminal justice system was not sufficient on its own.I
Judge Kozinski made this point in an earlier dissent to a denial of
rehearing in the FarrakhanP"l case. In his dissent, Judge Kozinski argued
that the court has relied on evidence of mere statistical disparities in finding
that the plaintiffs had established a Section 2 claim.'1 7 Under this view, the
claim presented was characterized as an impact only claim and, as such,
insufficient to state a claim."' However, the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs was not mere statistical data illustrating the disparities in the
criminal justice system."" The plaintiffs presented extensive evidence of
racial bias operating in the criminal justice system in the state of
Washington...". Given that the plaintiffs did not present mere statistical data,
the dispute between Judge Kozinski and the panel seems to be based on the
appropriate evidentiary showing. For example, Judge Kozinski states:
In Salt River, we held that statistical disparities were not enough
to establish vote denial under section 2. We explained that "a bare
statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority
does not satisfy the § 2 'results' inquiry" because causation cannot
We upheld a land-owner voting
be inferred from impact alone.
system against a section 2 challenge because it did not result in
discrimination "on account of race or color[]"

...

even though

.

whites were more likely to have a vote under that system because
their rate of home ownership was much higher than that of blacks
. . Evidence of racial disparities in the rate of land ownership, which
were then mapped directly onto the voter registration rolls, could not
193. Id. at 992.
194. Id. at 994.
195. Id. at 992-94.

196. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrahkan[), 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
197. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski,
J, dissenting).
198. Id. at 1125-26.
199. See Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth
Circuit 's

Heightened Section

2

"Intentional Discrimination -

Standard in

Farrakhanv. Gregoire, Ill COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 63-65 (2011).

200. See general/v Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (E.D. Wash.
1997).
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support a violation of the VRA. Salt River therefore stands for the
principle that plaintiffs cannot prove a section 2 violation without
substantial evidence other than a statistical disparity in some area
unrelated to voting. There is nothing in the record here beyond
statistical disparities, and the facts are settled. Summary judgment
for Washington is therefore the only possible outcome. 20 1
Judge Kozinski would have rejected the plaintiffs' claim because it was
not sufficient to allow the court to draw the inference of discrimination at
play in the political process.2 02 However, Salt River is distinguishable from
the Farrakhan case on one important ground: the Salt River plaintiffs
conceded that they were not being denied access to the ballot on account of
race. 203 As such, because the plaintiffs stipulated that race was not the cause
of the disparities, all the evidence the plaintiffs produced had to be construed
as simply evidence of the disparity between black and white ownership
rates.2 04 Thus, once the plaintiffs stipulated that there was no denial of access
to the ballot on account of race, the court in Salt River had no grounds by
which to draw the inference of discrimination.2 0 Similarly, three other cases
201. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski,
J, dissenting).
202. Id. at 1117.
203. Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595
(9th Cir. 1997).
204. The Ninth Circuit made this exact point in FarrakhanI:
Instead, we considered the external factors, but ultimately concluded
that the statistics evidencing the disproportionate percentage of white
landownership did not reflect racial discrimination and so failed to satisfy
the "on account of race" requirement of the results test. As we noted, this
conclusion was dictated by the Salt River plaintiffs' admission that there
was no evidence of discrimination as measured by the Senate Report
factors, and their stipulation to "the nonexistence of virtually every
circumstance which might indicate that landowner-only voting results in
racial discrimination," leaving only a bare statistical showing of disparate
impact to support their Section 2 claim.
Farrakhan1, 338 F.3d at 1018 (internal citations omitted); see also Haygood, supra
note 198, at 63 ("Significantly, the court noted that the plaintiffs stipulated to 'the
nonexistence of virtually every circumstance which might indicate that landowneronly voting results in racial discrimination.' leaving only a bare statistical showing
of disparate impact to support their section 2 claim.").
205. Smith, 109 F.3d at 586.
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that Judge Kozinski relied on could not accurately be classified as impact
only. These cases instead reflect disputes over the appropriate evidentiary
standard to apply-specifically, whether the defendants rebutted the
plaintiffs claim by establishing that the disparities could be explained by
something other than race.206
The Ninth Circuit's departure from the FarrakhanI and FarrakhanII
cases demonstrates additional inconsistencies among courts in applying
evidentiary requirements. In Farrakhan I, the panel emphasized that the
district court misconstrued the evidentiary requirement by failing to
adequately consider the disparate impact of racial bias in the criminal justice
system.2 07 The panel would have more accurately described the plaintiffs
evidentiary showing in the following way:
This factor underscores Congress's intent to provide courts
with a means of identifying voting practices that have the effect of
shifting racial inequality from the surrounding social circumstances
into the political process. To the extent that racial bias and
discrimination in the criminal justice system contribute to the
conviction of minorities for "Infamous crimes," such discrimination
would clearly hinder the ability of racial minorities to participate
effectively in the political process, as disenfranchisement is
automatic. Thus, racial bias in the criminal justice system may very
well interact with voter disqualifications to create the kinds of
barriers to political participation on account of race that are
prohibited by Section 2, rendering it simply another relevant social
and historical condition to be considered where appropriate.According to this evidentiary standard, the plaintiff may prevail upon
206. See, e.g., Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying
vote dilution claim on the grounds that denial was due to the choice to commit a
crime and not race); Irby v. Va. State Bd. Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th
Cir. 1989) (apathy); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office City Comm'rs Voter
Registration Div., 824 F. Supp. 514, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 28 F.3d 306, 307
(3d Cir. 1994) (low voter turnout).
207. Farrakhan 1, 338 F.3d at 1016, 1019 ("We hold that ... district court
misconstrued the causation requirement of a Section 2 analysis. . . . [T]he 1982
Amendments and subsequent case law make clear that factors outside the election
system can contribute to a particular voting practice's disparate impact when those
factors involve race discrimination.").
208. Id. at 1020.
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showing both that the racial bias in one external system for example, the
criminal justice system-"contributes" to disparities in that system and that
the racial bias operating in that system creates a barrier to political
participation for minorities within the electoral sphere."" Furthermore, the
evidentiary standard articulated in FarrakhanI explicitly rejected a showing
that would have required "that the practice . . . 'by itself,' cause the

discriminatory result."2 11 Instead, the court would have required the plaintiff
to produce evidence for the factfinder to "determine whether a challenged
voting practice interacts with surrounding racial discrimination in a
meaningful way or whether the practice is better explained by other factors
independent of race." 1
Here, the panel did not characterize the claims as impact only because,
as noted above, there was evidence presented to permit the court to draw the
inference of racial bias in the criminal justice system. 2 12 Rather, the panel
held that evidence of disparities in the criminal justice system, if established
at trial, may be sufficient to allow the fact-finder to draw the inference of
discriminatory effects in the political sphere under the totality of the
circumstances assessment, given the interaction between the disparities in
one system and the bias in another.2 13 The Ninth Circuit reiterated this
evidentiary showing in Farrakhan II and in doing so distinguished the
plaintiffs' evidence from impact only claims:

209. See id.
210. Id. at 1018. But see Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 539 ("While it is clear that these
factors may contribute to decreased minority political participation rates, plaintiffs'
evidence simply does not justify the conclusion that the purge law is the dispositive
force depriving minority voters of equal access to the political process in violation
of§ 2.").
211. Farrakhan1, 338 F.3d at 10 18.
212. See id. at 1020.
213. See id. at 10 19 ("Certainly, plaintiffs must prove that the challenged voter
qualification denies or abridges their right to vote on account of race, but the 1982
Amendments and subsequent case law make clear that factors outside the election
system can contribute to a particular voting practice's disparate impact when those
factors involve race discrimination."). But see Johnson, 353 F.3d 1287, 1318 n.16
(1Ith Cir. 2003) (Kravitch, J., dissenting), vacated, Johnson, 377 F.3d 163 (11th
Cir. 2004) ("Even if we assume that the Voting Rights Act applies to Florida's
provision, the plaintiffs still must demonstrate that specific racial biases in society
cause minorities to be convicted of felonies at a higher rate than whites.... Without
such an initial showing, the plaintiffs do not allege a sufficiently specific nexus
between racial discrimination and the felon disenfranchisement rule.").
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Plaintiffs have introduced expert testimony demonstrating that
the statistical disparity and disproportionality evident in
Washington's criminal justice system arises from discrimination,
and the State has failed to refute that showing. . .. If Plaintiffs in this
case demonstrated onlv that African Americans, Latinos, and Native
Americans are disproportionately affected by Washington's
disenfranchisement law, that clearly would not be enough under Salt
River. Unlike in Salt River, however, Plaintiffs have produced
evidence that Washington's criminal justice system is infected with
racial bias. The experts' conclusions are not "statistical disparity
alone," but rather speak to a durable, sustained difference in
treatment faced by minorities in Washington's criminal justice
system-systemic disparities which cannot be explained by "factors
independent of race."
Plaintiffs here have introduced evidence demonstrating what
the Salt River plaintiffs could not. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that
police practices, searches, arrests, detention practices, and plea
bargaining practices lead to a greater burden on minorities that
cannot be explained in race-neutral ways. The emphasis on crack
cocaine and street drug trafficking is not proportional to its harm to
the community or its share of the drug trade. The proportion of
African Americans and Latinos arrested for drug possession bears
no correlation the proportion of users among the races. Searching
African Americans and Latinos at higher rates than Whites even
though searches of African Americans and Latinos yield less
seizures makes little sense in non-racial terms. Detaining minority
defendants in disproportionate numbers to Whites even after
accounting for differences among defendants in the severity of their
crimes, prior criminal records, ties to the community, and the
prosecuting attorney's recommendation, cannot be understood as
race neutral. 2 14
By the time the Ninth Circuit decided FarrakhanIII, it was clear that
there was some discomfort with allowing the claim to proceed based on a
claim that the court now characterized as simple disparate impact.2 1 The
Ninth Circuit eventually rejected the standard articulated in FarrakhanI and
II for a heighted causal showing that would effectively require plaintiffs
214. FarrakhanII, 590 F.3d at 1012 (emphasis added).
215. See Farrakhan 1, 623 F.3d at 992-94.
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challenging felon disenfranchisement laws to demonstrate intentional race
discrimination.? 1
In a concurring opinion, Judge Thomas noted his reluctance to permit
such claims by explicitly acknowledging that the disproportionate racial
composition of prisons, even when accompanied by (what the court
disregarded as) circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination operating
within the criminal justice system, did not raise an inference of discriminatory
intent.2 1 7 Judge Thomas characterized the plaintiffs evidence as mere
disparate impact and from that position concluded that a Section 2 violation
could not be established on a showing of impact alone:
If it did, then enforceability of felon disenfranchisement laws
simply would depend on whether prison populations mirrored
general population demographics. Using that logic, if the prison
population deviated from the norm in a statistically significant way,
then felon disenfranchisement would be enjoined; if the prison
population returned to normal distributions, the injunction would be
lifted. That is not the foundation of a § 2 violation. Indeed, Congress
rejected this reasoning when it provided elsewhere in the statute that
"nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population. 2 ' 8

Such judicial construction of Section 2 vote denial claims is the product
of debates in the vote dilution context, where the avoidance of "impact only"
claims made sense given Congress's express prohibition against proportional
representation, eliminating entitlements based on the fact that the elected
bodies failed to reflect the racial demographics of the jurisdiction.- To
ensure that vote dilution claims could survive both constitutional scrutiny and
effectuate congressional will, the aim of the Gingles test was to provide three
preconditions that, when coupled with the objective factors drawn from the
216. Id. In Farrakhan III, the Ninth Circuit's analysis focused less on the
causal showing for vote denial claims based on disparate impacts and more on the
constitutional grounds for protecting the rights of states to disqualify voters on the
basis of felony convictions, as well as the lack of legislative intent to incorporate
felon disenfranchisement laws under Section 2's protections.

217. Id. at 994-96.
218. Id. at 996 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
219. See also 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012) (stating that "nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population").
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1982 Senate Report, adopted a "totality of the circumstances" assessment to
ensure that Section 2 vote dilution claims were not based on disparate impact
alone, and that the benchmark by which to measure the disparity was not
proportionate representation. 220 Such a test ensured that the challenged voting
practice "result[ed] in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on
account of race or color." 22' Whether the Gingles test was successful in
achieving that aim was challenged from the day it was announced, so the
tension between vote dilution claims and proportionate representation on
elected governing bodies remains.2In the vote denial context, however, judicial consternation over claims
to proportional racial representation may be misplaced. First, it should be
emphasized again that what is at stake in these claims is access to the ballot
and the right to participate on equal footing in the political process, as
opposed to the "aggregate right"2 2 3 of the group to select the candidate of its
choice. Stated differently, the concern over proportional racial representation,
which focused on minority group entitlements to elected officials of their
choice, 224 is not directly relevant. In fact, one court has suggested that the
aversion to, and denial of, impact only claims based on a repudiation of
proportional racial representation is not applicable in the vote denial
context. 225 Second, instead of introducing impermissible claims to
220. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
222. See CANNON, supra note 3, at 62 ("While the Gingles prongs do not
require proportional representation, officials in the DOJ responsible for enforcing
the VRA under its preclearance provisions and the state legislatures that drew the
new district lines interested these actions as a mandate to create minority-majority
districts.

. .

. [T]he DOJ seemed to be imposing proportional representation on the

states.").
223. Karlan, Sone Pessinisn About Fornalisi,supra note 98, at 1708.
224. Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a ColorBlind Societv?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 261, 262 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, eds.,
1992).
225. See Sinnons, 575 F.3d at 41 ("Congress was fundamentally concerned
with remedying discrimination in voting, rather than guaranteeing proportionality in
political representation. Plaintiffs' claim, which is based on mere disproportionality
in the prison population from felon disenfranchisement, does not implicate these
concerns."). Given that, it is conceivable that vote denial claims do not conflict with
the proportional representation proviso of Section 2, although plaintiffs would have
a difficult time claiming an entitlement to proportional racial demographics to the
extent that such claims would implicate anti-classification concerns or conflict with
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proportionate racial representation in governing bodies, the impact only
claims in vote denial cases may serve to smoke out impermissible forms of
race discrimination operating either within the electoral system, the
legislature adopting the particular policies, or other institutional structures,
like the criminal justice system. 2 Within this context, rejection of what
courts have construed as impact only claims seems particularly misguided,
prohibiting plaintiffs from challenging legitimate barriers to their political
and civic engagement." 7
Challenges to the constitutionality of impact only claims are grounded
in part in the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. 228 Moreover,
to establish a voting rights claim under the Fifteenth Amendment, plaintiffs
must still prove intentional race-based discrimination under Bolden.2
Furthermore, proponents challenging the constitutionality of the results test
under Section 2 have argued that by permitting claims based on impact only,
Congress exceeded its enforcement power under the test the Supreme Court
the states' constitutional rights to establish voting requirements under the
Constitution. Impact only claims would also expose Section 2 to further
constitutional scrutiny.
226. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination,and the
Essentialv Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 13, 2328 (2006)

("No matter how effective in eliminating such obvious forms of discrimination,
prohibitions against intentional discrimination could not address the more subtle
forms of discrimination that grew up in their place. The theory of disparate impact
initially played an important role in 'smoking out' these hidden forms of
discrimination . . . ...); Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 11, at 719-20
("Furthermore, '[e]ven if one agrees . . . that the only core value underlying Section
2 is the eradication of intentional discrimination, it does not follow that Section 2

plaintiffs should be required to prove intentional discrimination in order to make out
a claim .

.

. [a]n impact-based test may serve as a prophylactic against intentional

discrimination that might otherwise seep into the voting process undetected."').
227. See, e.g., Paul Moke & Richard B. Saphire, The Voting Rights Act and the
Racial Gap in Lost Votes, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 54 (2006) ("Be this as it may, it is
undeniable that the racial gap in lost votes represents a significant threat to the

integrity of the democratic process. Not only is it an overt form of vote denial that
is related to the history of discrimination in the fields of education and employment,
but it also has the effect of blocking equal participation in the electoral process on
the basis of race."); Tokaji, supra note 17, at 351 ("The most important point I press
here is that the Fourteenth Amendment provides greater protection in cases
involving participation (or vote denial) than it does in cases involving only

representation (or vote dilution).").
228. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Pers. Adm'r Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
229. See, e.g., Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 926 (2d Cir. 1996).
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established in City of Boerne v. Flores.23 0o In his vigorous dissent contesting
the denial of rehearing en banc in FarrakhanI, Judge Kozinski chastised the
court for "adopting a constitutionally questionable interpretation of the Act,"
and "lay[ing] the groundwork for the dismantling of the most important piece
of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction.""3 1 The panel, Judge Kozinski
argued, misinterpreted the Voting Rights Act and compromised its
constitutionality by permitting plaintiffs to meet their evidentiary showing by
presenting a case "based entirely on statistical disparities."23 2 By not
requiring plaintiffs to demonstratesomething more than impact, the panel had
compromised the constitutionality of Section 2 by interpreting the statute to
encompass statistical disparities unrelated to discrimination on the basis of
race. ' As Judge Kozinski argued, such a construction would render
Congress's remedial interventions in Section 2 completely incongruent and
disproportionate to the constitutional violation at issue.23 4
It is plausible that the felon disenfranchisement line of cases is unique.
Felon disenfranchisement laws, at least as the FarrakhanIII court concluded
in reaching its holding, were "affimnative[ly] sanctioned in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."2 3 5 Moreover, most of these cases reference an
230. See Presto, supra note 102. Some have argued that the congruent and
proportional requirement of Boerne does not apply to the Fifteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court has not ruled on this precise question. See general/v Evan T. Lee,
The Trouble with City of Boerne, and Why It Mattersfor the Voting Rig/its Act As

Well, available at http://papers.ssrn .com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2170578
(proposing a new test for determining the scope of Congressional enforcement
powers under the Fifteenth Amendment).
231. Farrakhanv. Washington, 359 F.3d at 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski,

J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1117.
233. Id. at 1119.
234. See id. at 1116 ("Section 2 is therefore a more congruent and proportional
remedy if plaintiffs are required to produce evidence of intentional discrimination in
an area external to voting which interacts with a voting practice to result in the denial
of the right to vote on account of race. By allowing plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment on a settled record containing nothing but disparities in the criminal justice
system, and absolutely no evidence of intentional discrimination, the panel destroys
section 2's congruence and proportionality as a remedy for the kind of constitutional
violations recognized in Hunter.).
235. Id. at 993. This proposition is debatable. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor
of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (1 Ith Cir. 2005) (arguing that there is no constitutional
tension between Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 challenges
to felon disenfranchisement based on discriminatory effects).
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extensive history of such laws in the United States; state felon
disenfranchisement laws stretch back all the way to the Reconstruction era.236
That being said, these cases help to reveal an explicit aversion towards
impact-based tests in a manner reminiscent of debates in the vote dilution
context.
Yet, outside of the felon disenfranchisement context, similar
reservations mark opinions rejecting Section 2 vote denial claims based in
part on disparate impact.2 37 In these cases, even circumstantial evidence did
not suffice to establish a basis to support a finding for plaintiffs under Section
2.23 8 For example, one court recently declined to recognize findings of
discriminatory purpose or effect even when changes to voting policies were
accompanied by procedural irregularities and racially charged statements by
contemporary lawmakers.2 3 9 Here again, impact-based claims have been
pegged as entitlements to proportionate racial representation and, without
demonstrating intent, plaintiffs attempting to establish vote denial claims
solely based on what judges characterizeas disparate impact will likely fail
to establish a claim under Section 2. This holds true even in cases such as
Farrakhan III, where circumstantial evidence is provided pursuant to the
results test of Section 2 that could support an inference of discriminatory
intent.
Furthermore, outside of the felon disenfranchisement context,
conflicting interpretations of evidentiary standards under Section 2 vote
denial claims have also led courts to re-characterize evidence of disparities
both inside the political process and external to it as impact only claims. 24 ) In
Ortiz, African American and Latino plaintiffs challenged a Pennsylvania
voter purge law on the grounds that "[these] voters [we]re purged from the
voter registration rolls at significantly higher rates than white voters." 24 1 The
236. Id. at 1220
237. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1375 (N.D. Ga.
2005)
238. Id.
239. Detzner, 2012 WL 4356839, at **15; see also N. Carolina State
Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. N. Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d
204 223 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding district court's finding that there was little evidence
of official discrimination since 1980 to be clearly erroneous). In Arlington Heights
v. Metro Housing Court, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Supreme Court identified a list of
factors comprising circumstantial evidence that might enable the factfinder to draw
the inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 267-68.
240. Ortiz v. Phila. Office of City Comn'rs Voter Registration Div., 824
F.Supp 514 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
241. Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. 514 at 516.
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district court concluded that there was no Section 2 violation after applying
the totality of the circumstances assessment. 242
On appeal, the dispute centered on the district court's conclusion that
Ortiz failed to show a causal relationship between the policy and the
disparities in participation rates, which Ortiz alleged denied minorities equal
access to the ballot. 243 The Third Circuit upheld the district court's finding

that the disparities in minority participation rates could be explained by
factors other than the Pennsylvania voter purge law (i.e. low minority turnout rates). 4 In reaching its conclusion, the Court devised a test that would
require plaintiffs to show that the voter purge law was the but-for cause of
the disparities in participation rates. 245 The court noted: "It is true that in
certain years minority voters have turned out in proportionately lower
numbers than have non-minority voters. But the purge statute did not cause
the statistical disparities which form the basis of Ortiz's complaint. We agree
with the Fifth Circuit that 'a protected class is not entitled to § 2 relief merely
because it turns out in a lower percentage than whites to vote. "'240
Here again, the court opinion indicates the court's reluctance to find a
Section 2 violation where the evidence of racial disparities put forth by
plaintiffs a characterized as only evidence of disparate impact and where the
corresponding relief is framed as an entitlement to proportionally racial
representation (i.e. minority turnout rates must be equal to that of whites).
Although the Third Circuit noted that "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a
certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives," 2 4 7 it applied that test in
a different way than the dissent. Judge Lewis in dissent concluded that the
purge law had a disparate impact on African American and Latino voters in
Philadelphia, and, specifically, that there was evidence of a "'clear and
consistent pattern' of systematically purging black and Latino voters at

242. See id. at 539.
243. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310.
244. Id. at 220.
245. Id.
246. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 314 (quoting Salas v. Southwest Texas Junior College
District, 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992)). Salas involved a vote dilution
challenge to an at-large election scheme brought by Latino voters.
247. Id. at 310. See also Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012)
(where the majority and the dissent applied the "totality of the circumstances" test,
but relied on different causal standards).
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significantly greater rates than whites."24 8 Furthermore, the dissent
emphasized the district court's conclusion that the "substantial
socioeconomic disparities among African-American, Latino, and white
residents of the City of Philadelphia . . . affect the ability of these minority
groups to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their
choice," and that the "conclusion was further supported by statistical
evidence demonstrating that minority voters in Philadelphia do not exercise
their right to vote to the same extent as white voters, which in part may be
attributable to discrimination and the overall socioeconomic status of
minorities in Philadelphia." 24 9 Thus, according to the dissent, the facts were
sufficient to establish a vote denial claim under Section 2.250 Furthermore,
the dissent argued that the majority applied the wrong causal standard:
I agree that § 2 plaintiffs must show a causal connection between
the voting practice they challenge and the deprivation of equal
political opportunity they allege. . . The language of the Voting
Rights Act, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments, and
controlling precedent all foreclose any argument that a voting
practice can violate § 2 without resulting in, or playing some part in
causing, the abridgement of citizens' voting rights. The majority,
however, actually requires something more than and different from
the

causal

connection

it

initially

describes. 2 5 1

In reaching its conclusion, the majority intimated that mere disparities
were insufficient without a heightened causal showing, because without such
a showing, the disparities in the turnout rate between minority voters and nonminority voters could not be attributed to the voter purge law. 252 The dissent
disagreed, declining to characterize the plaintiffs claims as evidence of only
statistical disparities:
The non-voting purge has a substantially disparate impact on
black and Latino Philadelphians. The uncontroverted statistical
evidence presented at trial, which the district court credited, showed
that each year, greater percentages of black and Latino voters were
slated for purging than were white voters. The evidence further
showed that white voters were reinstated at higher rates than blacks

248.
249.
250.
25 1.
252.

Id. at 320 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id. at 322-23.
See id. at 311.
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and Latinos, thus increasing the adverse disparate impact on these
minority groups as a result of the non-voting purge.
The record thus shows that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge
law operates to remove blacks and Latinos from Philadelphia
registration rolls at substantially higher rates than whites. In
addition, it establishes that black and Latino Philadelphians suffer
disadvantages and discrimination in various socioeconomic
categories.
On two occasions, the district court stated that the plaintiffs had
not proven a violation of § 2 because they had failed to demonstrate
that "the purge law is the dispositive force in depriving minority
voters of equal access to the political process . . . That is not the

proper legal standard. Section 2 does not require plaintiffs to prove
that a challenged voting practice or procedure is "the dispositive
force," or the only cause, or even the principal cause, of unequal
political opportunity. Neither the statute, nor its legislative history,
nor the relevant case law supports such a reading. To the contrary,
that authority requires us to determine whether a challenged law
interacts with other, external conditions to limit the political
opportunities available to members of protected classes.m
Such disputes are not confined to the earlier vote denial cases decided
soon after Gingles; disagreements over the appropriate evidentiary standard
to apply are also reflected in more recent cases in which plaintiffs have
alleged vote denial.m
B. Heightening the Bar to Establishing a Causal Relationship
Disputes over evidentiary showings may explain why some claims are
characterized as impact only. Part of the reasoning behind the rejection of
some vote denial claims is that courts characterize some of these claims as

253. Id. at 320-21, 323 (internal citations omitted).
254. Compare Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 406 (upholding the district court's finding

that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate both that the challenged proof-of-citizenship
requirement had a discriminatory impact on Latinos in the political system and that
the challenged requirement interacted with "the social and historical climate of
discrimination" to produce disparities in political participation) with Gonzalez, 677
F.3d at 442-44 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (disputing the majority's conclusion and
applying a causal showing akin to correlation).
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impact only, even when additional circumstantial evidence is presented.
are
Furthermore, impact only claims based on statistical disparities
perceived as such in part due to judicial consternation over minority claims
to proportionate representation. This is so even when the provision against
such claims directly implicates only governing bodies, not participation by
the electorate. Once claims are characterized in this way, it is difficult for
plaintiffs to state a Section 2 claim without establishing either an explicit
intent to discriminate on the part of the legislature enacting the challenged
policy or that the external system-in the cases of felon disenfranchisement
and the criminal justice system-is infected with intentional race-based
discrimination.
Heightened causation requirements have presented another barrier to
vote denial claims. Causation is an essential component of Section 2 vote
denial and vote dilution claims.m6 However, Congress never specified the

causation standard for Section 2 claims. By its explicit terms, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act requires that a plaintiff prevail only if "'based on the
totality of the circumstances . . . the challenged voting practice results in

discrimination on account of race."'"2 7 Requiring plaintiffs to show a causal
link or connection between the challenged practice and the denial or
abridgment of the right to vote, resulting in minority voters having "less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
25
helps to ensure that the challenged practice results in a denial "on
process,"m
account of race." 2 59 This is certainly the case in vote dilution cases where
causation is established by meeting the three Gingles preconditions and
weighing the Senate factors under the totality of the circumstances inquiry.
Such a showing demonstrates that but-for' the challenged electoral
system-for example, at large or single member districts-minorities would
be able to elect the representative of their choice. In vote dilution cases, the

255. See Sinnions, 575 F.3d at 42 n.23 (citing Ricci for the claim that reliance
on mere statistical disparities is not "strong evidence of disparate impact").
256. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 405.
257. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 405 (citing Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d
1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003)).
258. 52 U.S.C. § 1030 1(a) (2012).
259. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012).
260. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 15 (2009) (citations omitted)
(internal quotes omitted) ("In setting out the first requirement for § 2 claims, the
Gingles Court explained that '[u]nless minority voters possess the potential to elect
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot
claim to have been injured by that structure or practice.' . . . Without such a showing,

"there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.").
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burden is on the plaintiff to show that the challenged practice, not merely
their fewer numbers at the ballot, is the reason that minority groups have been
unsuccessful in electing the candidate of their choice.2 61
Yet, because Congress never specified the causation standard for vote
denial claims and subsequent Supreme Court case law has provided little
guidance, 262 causation standards for these types of claims are all over the
map. Courts deciding vote denial claims based on evidence of
disproportionate racial impact have articulated causal showings based on the
following: but-for causation;2 63 causation inferred from statistical disparity,
given the interaction between the challenged practice and social and historical
conditions evincing racial bias;2 64 correlation between the challenged practice
and disparate impact in the political process; 0' disproportionate risk or

261. See, e.g., John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional knperative of

ProportionalRepresentation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 164 n.4 (1984) ("The aversion to
proportional representation in this sense is readily understandable: Because the
winner-take-all electoral system is heavily biased toward over-representation of the
majority, it is unlikely that any minority, racial or political, will be represented in
proportion to its size. So a lack of proportionality of outcome is not in and of itself
symptomatic of discrimination.").
262. See Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Wash. 1997) ("In
determining whether Plaintiffs have alleged circumstances that could prove a causal
relationship between Washington's felon disenfranchisement law and the denial of
votes to racial minorities, precedent provides little guidance as to which factors
should be considered salient. Consequently, the Court's assessment of Plaintiffs'
complaint is focused on any circumstances alleged by Plaintiffs that would tend to
establish that Washington's felon disenfranchisement law operates with social and
historical conditions such that it causes individuals to be denied access to voting
privileges on the basis of race.").
263. See, e.g., Ortiz 28 F.3d at 324.
264. See, e.g., Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp.
1245, 1264 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff'dsub noin. Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push,
Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991).
265. See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2006),
superseded by 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) ("On remand, the district court will
consider the voluminous amount of the plaintiffs' evidence, including the regression
analysis showing the correlation between overvoting and the percentage of AfricanAmerican voters in a given precinct."); United States v. Berks Cty., 277 F. Supp. 2d
570, 581 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
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likelihood of disenfranchisement;2
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and simple disparate impact. 267 Despite

the wide variance, few have applied the less rigorous causal requirementfor example, a causal showing similar to correlation or one requiring the
plaintiffs to demonstrate disproportionate risk of disenfranchisement. 268
An analysis of the Section 2 vote denial case law suggests that courts
require plaintiffs to demonstrate a heightened causal showing. Courts have
required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged policy caused the
disparities in participation rates and show that the underlying historical and
social conditions caused the disparities in participation rates.2 6 9 Requiring
266. See, e.g., Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 897 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
("Under the facts alleged in the first amended complaint, the disparate rates of
undervotes indicates that Plaintiffs, as voters residing in predominantly Latino and
African American precincts where punch card machines are utilized, bear a greater
risk that their votes will not be counted than do other voters. As such, Plaintiffs'
participation in the political process could be significantly diminished. Accepting
Plaintiffs' facts as true we find Plaintiffs' Section 2 allegations sufficient to state a
claim.").
267. See, e.g., Goodloc v. Madison Cty. Bd. Election Comm'rs, 610 F. Supp.
240, 243 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (upholding the challenge to the invalidation of 250
absentee ballots by the Elections Commissioner based on improper notarization,
where the majority of which were cast by African American voters).
268. But see Stewart, 444 F.3d at 878, vacated as moot, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir.
2007), McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 897 ("Because the African-American
plaintiffs claim that they are disproportionately denied the right to have their ballots
counted properly, the district court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs did not state
a claim for a violation of the right to vote under the Voting Rights Act.");
McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 897 ("Under the facts alleged in the first amended
complaint, the disparate rates of undervotes indicates that Plaintiffs, as voters
residing in predominantly Latino and African American precincts where punch card
machines are utilized, bear a greater risk that their votes will not be counted than do
other voters. As such, Plaintiffs' participation in the political process could be
significantly diminished. Accepting Plaintiffs' facts as true we find Plaintiffs'
Section 2 allegations sufficient to state a claim.").
269. For example, in Ortiz the court concluded:
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the purge law interacts with
social and historical conditions to deny minority voters equal access to the
political process and to elect their preferred representatives, particularly
since it is undisputed that the purge procedure is administered fairly and
that there is ample opportunity for purged voters to re-register to vote.
Although it is clear that the operation of the purge law removes AfricanAmerican and Latino voters from the voter registration rolls at higher rates
than white voters, this disproportionate impact does not rise to the level of
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plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice or policy, standing
alone, is the cause of the observed racial disparity, amounts to a heightened
causal showing, as one court has noted:
[D]emanding "by itself' causation would defeat the interactive
and contextual totality of the circumstances analysis repeatedly
applied by our sister circuits in Section 2 cases, as they also require
a broad, functionally-focused review of the evidence to determine
whether a challenged voting practice interacts with surrounding
racial discrimination in a meaningful way or whether the practice's
disparate impact "is better explained by other factors independent of
race."
a per se violation of § 2, even when considered in light of the court's
findings of the existence of racially polarized voting, socioeconomic
disparities in education, employment and health, racial appeals in some
elections, and the failure of the City in some instances to address the needs
of minority citizens. While it is clear that these factors may contribute to
decreased minority political participation rates, plaintiffs' evidence simply
does not justify the conclusion that the purge law is the dispositive force
in depriving minority voters of equal access to the political process in
violation of§ 2.
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 3 13 (quoting Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of City Comm'rs Voter
Registration Div., 824 F. Supp 514, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).; Compare Gonzalez v.
Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 406 (9th Cir. 2012) with Gonzale,-

677 F3d at 444

(Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Gonzalez v. Arizona, a case involving, among other claims, a challenge
to Proposition 200's proof of citizenship requirement under Section 2, the
disagreement between the majority and one of the dissenting judges centered on the
appropriate causation standard. Compare Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 406 ("The district
court noted that not a single expert testified to a causal connection between
Proposition 200's requirements and the observed difference in the voting rates of
Latinos and that Gonzalez had failed to explain how Proposition 200's requirements
interact with the social and historical climate of discrimination to impact Latino
voting in Arizona.") with Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 444 (Pregerson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("In my view, statistics showing that Proposition 200's
polling place provision disparately impact Latino voters, when coupled with
Arizona's long history of discrimination against Latinos, current socioeconomic
disparities between Latinos and whites in Arizona, and racially polarized voting in
Arizona, establish that Proposition 200's polling place provision results in
discrimination on account of race.").
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Moreover, the district court's "by itself' causation standard
would effectively read an intent requirement back into the VRA, in
direct contradiction of the clear command of the 1982 Amendments
to Section 2. A facially neutral voting qualification, even one that
results in substantial discriminatory effects, would only be
discriminatory "by itself' if its purpose was to achieve those
discriminatory effects. Instead, courts must be able to consider
whether voting practices "accommodate or amplify the effect that
. . discrimination has on the voting process," absent proof that the
challenged practice was adopted or maintained out of overt,
intentional racial animus, its disproportionate effect on minority
voters could only ever be "on account of race" through its interaction
with racial discrimination "outside of the challenged voting
mechanism."o270

However, not long after this decision the Ninth Circuit adopted a more
rigorous causal showing. In every case challenging a felon
disenfranchisement law under Section 2, courts have embraced a more
rigorous causal standard.2 7 ' Courts adopting a heightened causal requirement
have required plaintiffs to demonstrate race-based intent.-2
270. Farrakhan1, 338 F.3d at 1018-19 (internal citations omitted).
27 1. Two courts explicitly retreated from decisions recognizing Section 2 vote
denial violations based on felon disenfranchisement. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor
of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (1 th Cir. 2005); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th
Cir. 2010). In the prior cases, courts had not only recognized felon
disenfranchisement claims as within the ambit of Section 2, but had also found that
the plaintiff could meet its showing by demonstrating that the challenged voting
qualification interacted with other historical, economic, or social factors to produce
racially discriminatory results in the political process. See Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at
1020; Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1306 (11 th Cir. 2003), declined
to/fllow, 405 F.3d 1214 (1 Ith Cir. 2005) ("This factor underscores Congress's
intent to provide courts with a means of identifying voting practices that have the
effect of shifting racial inequality from the surrounding social circumstances into
the political process."); Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1306 ("When taken in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs, a fact-tinder could conclude that under the totality of the
circumstances test, this evidence demonstrates intentional racial discrimination
behind Florida's felon disenfranchisement as well as a nexus between
disenfranchisement and racial bias in other areas, such as the criminaljustice system,
in violation of the Voting Rights Act.").
272. Legal scholars have recognized that the effect of such heightened
causation requirements effectively requires the plaintiff to prove discriminatory
intent. See, e.g., Haygood, supra note 198, at 52; Moke & Saphire, supra note 226,
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C. Failureof Courts to Establish What Level ofDisparitv is Significant

The re-characterization of vote denial claims based on disproportionate
racial impact as "impact only" given the lack of consistent evidentiary
standards governing the causal showing required for when an observed
disparities can accurately be attributed to a voter qualification or election
practice, are not the only barriers facing plaintiffs. Despite acknowledging
that the right to vote is fundamental,2 7 3 courts have yet to establish what level
of disparity for example, as between the minority voting rate and nonminority voting rate-is significant. For example, in one challenge to the use
of the punch-card voting system, minority voters sought injunctive relief to
prevent the use of such ballots in California's then-pending recall election. 7
In denying the motion for preliminary injunction, the district court noted that
the plaintiffs did not argue that punch card systems were only used in minority
precincts (i.e. enforced in a discriminatory fashion), or that the error rate
resulting from these punch card systems was so high that the result was
consistent denial of minority voters' right to participate equally in the
political process.2 7 In addition, the district court emphasized that the
plaintiffs did not claim that the challenged practice, combined with the
lingering effects of discrimination, resulted in a disproportionate racial
impact, and concluded that the plaintiff presented evidence to demonstrate
only one Senate factor. 27' Finally, the district court concluded that, on the
whole, the disparities were not that significant:
In sum, Plaintiffs suggest a Voting Rights Act violation based

exclusively upon the alleged error rate of machines that poll
"majority" as well as minority voters, and are used in counties
containing nearly one-half of California's voters. They contend that
some 40,000 votes may be lost as a result of higher error rates (many
if not most of which votes will be cast by non-minority voters) in a
at 51 ("The flaw in this approach is that the strict causation test is tantamount to a
requirement of intentional discrimination, even in the face of a congressional
decision in favor of an effects test.").
273. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (citing Yick Wo. v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
274. See Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 278 F. Supp. 2d
1131, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev'd, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en hane,
344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003), af'"d, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003).
275. Id. at 142.
276. See id.
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state of nearly eight million voters. Accordingly, there is, at best, a
slim chance that Plaintiffs will be able to prove that punch-card
machines in California "interact[] with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives."n
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision denying injunctive
relief, citing the required causal showing, and concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits, due in
part to the district court's finding that the disparities were not significant:

.

In a nutshell, plaintiffs argue that the alleged disparate impact
of punch-card ballots on minority voters violated Section 2 . .
Plaintiffs allege that minority voters disproportionately reside in
punch-card counties and that, even within those counties, punchcard machines discard minority votes at a higher rate. To establish a
Section 2 violation, plaintiffs need only demonstrate "a causal
connection between the challenged voting practice and [a]
prohibited discriminatory result." There is significant dispute in the
record, however, as to the degree and significance of the disparity.
Thus, although plaintiffs have shown a possibility of success on the
merits, we cannot say that at this stage they have shown a strong
likelihood.ns

The Ninth Circuit's limited and deferential review of the district court's
conclusion, given the procedural posture of the case, may explain the decision
to a certain degree. 27 9 At the same time, the opinion does little to suggest what
causal showing would be required for these types of claims.
Similarly, in Mark Wandering Medicine v. McCulloch,'" Native
Americans living on Indian Reservations challenged the defendant
jurisdiction's failure to locate satellite polling places at a convenient distance
from the Indian Reservations, which reduced the ability of these voters to
register late and submit in-person absentee ballots.2 1 1 In reaching its
conclusion denying the motion for preliminary injunction, the district court
277. Shelley, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (internal citations omitted).
278. Shelley, 344 F.3d at 918-19 (internal citations onitted).
279. See id. at 918.
280. Mark Wandering Med. v. McCulloch, 906 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Mont.
2012), order vacated sub non. Mark Wandering Mcd. v. McCulloch, 544 F. App'x
699 (9th Cir. 2013).
281. Id. at 1086.
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emphasized that, absent intentional discrimination, even where it "[wa]s
well-established that there has been a history of official discrimination in
Montana that has touched the right of Native Americans to participate in the
democratic process,"28 2 the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the electoral
procedures resulted in both a denial of access to the political process and the
inability of the minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice.
First, the district court emphasized that some of the county commissions
challenged in the action were comprised primarily of Democratic Party
members-some of whom were members of local tribes or received support
from the tribal council-and that because Native Americans voted primarily
for Democrats, this provided evidence that these voters were successful in
electing the candidate of their choice. 28 4 Second, the court emphasized that
there were no real barriers to access to the ballot, as the plaintiffs had other
reasonable means of voting notwithstanding evidence that "poverty,
unemployment, and limited access to vehicles render it difficult for residents
of the three reservations to travel to the county seats to register late and cast
in-person absentee ballots."2 8 Instead, the court noted that:
[T]estimony at the hearing established that it is relatively
simple for Native American voters in Montana to register to vote
without driving to the county elections office. In addition to
registration by mail, there was testimony that various organizations
had organized voter registration drives on the reservation where
applicants filled out voter registration cards that were delivered to
election officials. A person who registers by mail or as part of a
registration drive could either request an absentee ballot by mail or
vote at local polling places on election day.2 8 0
Although the Native American plaintiffs might have had less of an
opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice, due to the failure to place
satellite offices in more conveniently located jurisdictions, the district court
viewed the challenged policy as an inconvenience that did not create a
substantial barrier to access to the ballot and did not prevent the plaintiffs
282. Id. at 1089 (citing Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.3d 1113, 1129 (9th Cir.
2000)) (footnotes omitted).
283. Id. at 1090-91.
284. Id. at 1090.
285. Id. at 1089.
286. Id. at 1091.
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from electing the candidates of their choice.2 8 7 What the court's analysis
misses is the fact that a challenged practice could generate disparities in
opportunity without yet registering in the composition of the elected
governing body. Second, the court's analysis fails to suggest what level of
inconvenience amounts to less of an opportunity on account of race. In effect,
the court's analysis suggests that if a challenged policy is viewed as an
inconvenience or slight burden, an inquiry into whether the challenged policy
leads to less of an opportunity for minorities to elect the candidates of their
choice is halted:
In the only case the parties or the Court could find that
addressed early voting locations, the federal court in the Middle
District of Florida noted that [w]hile it may be true that having to
drive to an early voting site and having to wait in line may cause
people to be inconvenienced, inconvenience does not result in a
denial of "meaningful access to the political process ... [n]or does
the Court have the authority to order the opening of additional sites
based merely on the convenience of voters."
There being no evidence of discriminatory intent, no showing
that Plaintiffs are unable to elect representatives of their choice, and
no authority for Plaintiffs' request, the Court must conclude
Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of any of their
claims. 2 88

A court's classification of a claim as inconvenient may be akin to the
classification of other types of claims as impact only. Inconvenience suggests
that, despite clear evidence that the challenged practice may interact with
social and historical factors to influence registration rates and voter turnout,
these burdens are not significant enough to establish a vote denial claim.
Furthermore, even an inconvenience that impacts a disproportionate number
of minorities functions effectively as an evidentiary bar in cases where courts

287. Id. at 1092.
288. Id. at 1091 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted), see also Jacksonville
Coalition For Voter Protection v. Hood, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 (M.D. Fl. 2010)
(finding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate substantial likelihood of success in a
challenge to the jurisdiction's provision of only one early voting site in a
predominantly African American county where there was a documented history of
disproportionate disenfranchisement of African American voters in Florida
following the 2000 election).
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decline to draw an inference of discriminatory effect from the current policy
where there is evidence of electoral success within the jurisdiction.
Without a more searching inquiry, courts have essentially made ad hoc
judgments about which burdens are significant and which burdens are
inconveniences that protected groups can overcome. 28 ' Moreover, although
the current composition of governing bodies might suggest that minorities
have been able to overcome the barriers that they allege the challenged
practice has caused, it is not the case that the composition of these governing
bodies will remain. In fact, guaranteed electoral outcomes is explicitly not
protected under the Act-although in Mark Wandering Medicine, electoral
success functioned as a barrier to demonstrating a probability of success on
the merits.2"
V.

DEVISING

A NEw TEST FOR VOTE DENIAL CHALLENGES UNDER
SECTION

2

While not directly resolving all the objections noted above, recent cases
involving challenges to voter identification laws have effectively tried to limit
purported constitutional tensions created by impact-based claims in the
voting rights context, particularly when access to the ballot is at stake.(' This
subpart seeks to answer the following questions: first, how have these courts
grappled with the tensions articulated by critiques of results-based tests'?;
second, what are some judicially imposed limiting or "mediating

289. For example, in Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson County. N.D., the district
court found that the mail-in procedure that the jurisdiction adopted as a cost-saving
measure, after it closed seven out of eight of its polling places was not simply an
inconvenience: the plaintiffs had demonstrated a fair chance of success on the merits
of their Section 2 claim, given the disparate impact of the policy on Native American
voters and social and economic factors. See Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson County,

N.D., No. 2: 10-CV-095, 2010 WL 4226614, at *3 (D.N.D. Oct. 21, 2010). The court
stated its findings as follows: "[T]he County asserts that the mail-in procedure
actually solves the transportation problemns and will increase voter participation.
While such an argument is tenable in communities with stable housing
arrangements, poverty and transience on the Reservation makes mail balloting more
difficult for tribal members. . . . The evidence suggests that Native American are
more likely to have not received a ballot application, which when coupled with a
decreased ability to vote in person, creates a disparate impact." Id at 3.

290. See Wandering Med., 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
291. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 303 (5th Cir. 2016).
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that may permit Section 2 challenges to move forward without

offending equal protection principles identified?
A. Problems with Disparate Impact Tests/fbr the New Vote Denial Claims

Today, voter suppression tactics look very different than they did in
1965. As one scholar famously put it, "Bull Connor is dead." 2 3 Such a
statement captures the idea that evidence of overt forms of voter
disenfranchisement based on race are typically few and far between.
Congress understood this when it incorporated a results test in Section 2 as
part of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act. However,
prophylactic remedies do not cease to have value simply because they prove
successful in curbing the violations they set out to prevent.
Current litigation in the area of vote denial under Section 2 demonstrates
the extent to which the terms of the debate, and more concretely, the
recognition or acceptance of claims brought by minority plaintiffs, are
constrained by the politics of disparate impact.2 94 As noted, vote denial and
vote dilution are different. Vote denial implicates outright access to the ballot,
or the right to have one's vote counted, whereas vote dilution involves the

292. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282

n.8 (2011) (describing mediating principles as "interpret[ing] a clause purposively
to vindicate one particular understanding of the concept or value the clause expressly
guarantees, here the equal protection of the laws.").
293. See Richard L. Hasen, CongressionalPower to Renew the Preclearance
Provisions ofthe Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,

179 (2005) ("In 1965 and even in 1982, when Congress reenacted Section Five's
preclearance through 2007, Congress could point to significant acts of intentional
racial discrimination by covered states to support preclearance provisions. Today,
Congress would be hard-pressed to find widespread evidence of such discrimination.
I refer to this issue as the 'Bull Connor is Dead' problem."). See also Antony Page
& Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of
Implicit Bias, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 3 (2009) ("Any discussion of voting-related

discrimination must frankly acknowledge that intentional discrimination still exists,
but even the most ardent supporter of the modern civil rights movement would have
to admit-at least as it relates to the casting of ballots in polling places-that such
obvious, intentional discrimination in voting is likely to have less impact than it has
had in the past.").
294. See generallv Tigrett v. Cooper, 855 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Tenn. 2012);
Ga. State Conf. NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. Comm'rs, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D.
Ga. 2013); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010).
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weight that attaches to one's vote as a member of a minority group.' Thus,
the substantive difference between Section 2 vote denial claims and vote
dilution claims is an important one from a conceptual and constitutional
standpoint, because vote denial claims directly affect the ability of voters to
participate in the political process. Even so, the debates that have divided
courts in the vote dilution context implicate claims in the vote denial
context, 296 making more urgent the call to either Congress or the courts to
articulate a clear test for deciding these distinct claims.297
The two claims-dilution and denial-brought pursuant to Section 2
must be bifurcated through the articulation of effective standards by which
judges can determine whether a viable Section 2 vote denial claim has been
made. There are three reasons why this bifurcation is necessary. First, proving
intentional discrimination becomes increasingly difficult in a world where
evidence of overt racism is uncommon and evidence of intentional acts of
racism by institutional or individual actors is rare. 2 ) Second, the evidentiary
295. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). See also, Tokaji, supra note 15, at 691.
296. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial siupra note 11, at 719-20.
297. See generally Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 11. The Supreme

Court has yet to establish a test to determine exactly when a Section 2 claim has
been made. Although a few lower courts have noted that the test for vote denial
claims should be distinct from the vote dilution test under Gingles. See, e.g., Ortiz
824 F. Supp. at 523: Common Cause, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. All of the cases
reviewed apply the totality of the circumstances test. In the circuits that have
identified vote denial claims as distinct and explicitly articulated a vote denial test,
all have adopted the totality of the circumstances test. See Smith v. Comnonwealth,
No. CIV.A. 3:08CV800, 2009 WL 2175759 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2009), aff"dsub nom;
Smith v. Virginia, 353 F. App'x 790 (4th Cir. 2009); Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d
843, 878 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007); Farrakhan
v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003): Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F.
Supp. 1513, 1529 (E.D. Mo. 1987), rev'd. 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989).
298. The role of unconscious racism as a feature of American society,
supported by implicit bias empirical research, supports this contention. See general/v
Kang et al., knplicitBias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1124 (2012); Jennifer
L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 .1.
&

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY

Soc. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989). One study looked at how implicit bias affected elections
administration by examining the unconscious biases of poll workers:
But racial bias in election administration-more specifically, in the
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showings that arise in the impact-based vote dilution context that have longtroubled jurists concerns stemming from objections to essentialism and the
remedy of proportional racial representation-are different in vote denial
cases. 2" Third, as the discussion above elucidates, disagYreement over the
appropriate benchmarks and standards in the vote dilution case law have
restricted the ability of courts to recognize the aspects of Section 2 vote denial
challenges that include impact-based claims and increased the evidentiary
burden for plaintiffs.
Although judges have recognized the need to bifurcate the test for vote
denial from vote dilution, most, if not all, have adopted a version of the
totality of the circumstances test.3 00 However, the totality of the
circumstances test does not prevent courts from re-characterizing claims as
impact only or provide any guidance to courts on the correct causal standard
to apply. A disparate impact test, similar to the Title VIl burden-shifting
framework, may address this problem. Most scholars who have addressed the
need for a distinct vote denial test have proposed some version of the

interaction between poll workers and prospective voters at a polling place
on election day-can be unintentional as well. Massive amounts of
research support the notion that people engage in unconscious or implicit

discrimination-that "good people often discriminate and they often
discriminate without being aware of it..." Unconscious bias, however,
may not just have implications for the specific electoral choices made by
voters when they step behind the curtain and into the privacy of the voting
booth. Indeed, unconscious bias may prevent a voter from getting into the

voting booth and casting a ballot in the first place.
See Page & Pitts, supra note 292, at 3-4. Courts' inability to acknowledge
implicit biases and unconscious racism in legal doctrine has serious hindered the
ability of plaintiffs to find remedies for such latent forms of discrimination. See
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987) ("First, the present doctrine,
by requiring proof that the defendant was aware of his animus against blacks,
severely limits the number of individual cases in which the courts will acknowledge
and remedy racial discrimination.").
299. See Tokaji, supra note 11, at 720-21 ("In vote dilution cases, it is essential
that the court examine this sort of circumstantial evidence in assessing whether a
particular electoral scheme diminishes minorities' voting strength compared to other
feasible alternatives. A court does not need to rely on such circumstantial evidence,
however, when there is direct evidence that an electoral practice has the result of
disproportionately denying minority votes.").
300. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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A version of the disparate
disparate impact, burden-shifting model.3 0
impact, burden-shifting model looks something like this:
Plaintiff must show that:
(1) the challenged practice results in the disproportionate denial
of minority votes (i.e., that it has a disparate impact on minority
voters);

(2) that the disparate impact is traceable to the challenged
practice's interaction with social and historical conditions
(3) Once the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden should
shift to the defendant to justify the challenged practice. Various
proposals exists for the defendants showing once the plaintiff makes
its prima facie case, ranging from "show[ing that] the challenged
practice is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest, 02
to "clear and convincing evidence that the burden on voting is
outweighed by the state interests in the challenged standard,
practice, or procedure."-M'
However, there are some limitations with this test. First, the disparate
impact test still requires that the plaintiff connect or link the disparity, which
301. See, e.g., Jason Rathod, A Post-Racial Voting Rights Act, 13 BERKELEY
J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 139, 144 (2011) ("Congrcss should provide a
comprehensive framework for evaluating such claims by codifying the same burdenshifting framework as courts apply in disparate impact employment discrimination
cases."): Jonathan Sgro, Notc. IntentionalDiscriminationin Farrakhanv. Gregoire:
The Ninth Circuit's Voting Rights Act Standard "Results in the New .Jin Crow, 57
VILL. L. REv. 139, 172-73 (2012) (footnotes omitted) ("Under such a test, the

plaintiffs would have the burden of showing that 'a certain clectoral law, practice,
or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in
the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives.' The test would require plaintiffs to show both a disparate impact
on minority voters and a causal connection with social and historical conditions. The
appropriate causal connection would be a contributing cause, not a dispositive
force."): Tokaji, supra note 11, at 724-26.
302. Tokaji, supra note 11, at 724-26.
303. Daniel P. Tokaji, App/ing Section 2 to the New V<oe Denial, 50 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. REv. 439, 473-74. (2015) [hereinafter Tokaji, Applying Section 2].
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is external to political process, with the disproportionate disenfranchisement
in the political sphere.3 04 The connection or link between the two systems is
a version of the interaction standard, and, like that test, it does not provide
guidance to courts on what is the appropriate level of causation-ranging
from but-for causation to correlation that must be demonstrated. Second,
courts may be reluctant to recognize impact-based claims as an element of
the test, or might re-characterize these claims as impact only claims.3 05 Third,
where impact-claims, particularly in those cases where there is no evidence
of discriminatory purpose in the implementation of the law, incorporating a
modified disparate impact test without more into the vote denial context does
not solve the problem of determining the appropriate weight of the state's
interest in imposing voting requirements and designing or managing election
procedures. Unless courts are willing to characterize the burden on voting as
a particularly severe or burdensome restriction, and require the defendant
jurisdiction to demonstrate a narrowly tailored compelling interest, 30 6 the
plaintiffs claim will typically be rebutted. If the policy is viewed as a
"reasonable, non-discriminatory restriction," then the state's justification will
be subject to a lower burden of proof. " Thus, the modified disparate impact

model may be insufficient particularly where courts are reluctant to accept
impact-based claims as probative of discriminatory burdens in the electoral
system even when linked to social and historical conditions.
B. A More Robust Test for the New Vote Denial
A more robust test for vote denial would enable plaintiffs to successfully
challenge qualifications and procedures that disproportionately exclude
minority groups. Like simple disparate impact tests, such a test should ensure
that minority groups remain active participants in an increasingly diverse
electorate. It should also "serve as a prophylactic against intentional
discrimination that might otherwise seep into the voting rights process

304. See id. at 717.
305. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
306. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("Thus, as we have
recognized when those rights are subjected to 'severe' restrictions, the regulation
must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.').
307. See id. ("But when a state election law provision imposes only
'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of voters, 'the State's important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify' the restrictions.").
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undetected."3 "' This section suggests several ways to strengthen these
proposed tests for new vote denial claims.
In the test I propose, and similar to the tests outlined above, the plaintiff
must first establish that the challenged standard, practice, or procedure is
correlated3 09 with disparities in registration or participation rates for
minorities. The first prong is also satisfied by showing that the challenged
standard, practice, or procedure enacts eligibility requirements that are
minority voters are less likely to meet or repeals a practice or procedure that
minority voters are more like to use. 3' Next, and also as the tests described
above suggest, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the disparate racial impact
are correlated with "social and historical conditions" external to the electoral
system. This would serve as the evidentiary showing required to link the
challenged standard, practice, or procedure with the racial disparity in for
example, political access and participation, and provide a basis by which the
factfinder can infer causality.
For example, when a challenged voting
qualification-such as a proof of citizenship requirement which results in
Latino voters having their votes not counted at disproportionately higher rates
due to insufficient documentation, showing that the inability to procure the
required forms of identification is correlated with social, economic and/or
historical discrimination, this should be sufficient to state a claim.
Once the court determines that the plaintiffs data and analysis are both
reliable and statistically significant, the court must determine the required
showing in the defendant's jurisdiction to rebut the claim. The defendant's
subsequent rebuttal is pegged to the level of minority exclusion from the
308. Tokaji, supra note 11, at 720.
309. Under this test, Plaintiffs would be required of course to show disparities
that are statistically significant to meet their burden. In the disparate impact analysis,
courts should also assess the practical significance of the statistical finding. See
generalivNote, Kevin Tobia, DisparateStatistics, 126 YALE L. J. 2394-2397 (2017)

(discussing practical significance in disparate impact analysis for cases alleging
employment discrimination). Practical significance includes a magnitude inquiry
and a confidence inquiry. "[A] 'magnitude inquiry' [is] an analysis of the magnitude
of the result supported by statistical evidence [and] a 'confidence inquiry' [is] an
analysis of the strength of the inference drawn between the statistical evidence and
the conclusion on draws from it about the real world." Id. at 2394.
310. See Tokaji, Applying Section 2, supra note 303, at 475.

3 11. Correlation can be demonstrated through statistical techniques, such as
regression analysis. See generall Alan 0. Sykes, Inaugural Coase Lecture:
Introduction to Regression Analysis (December 1, 1992), http://www.law.uchicago
.edu/files/files/20. Sykes_. Regression_.pdf.
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political process within a particular jurisdiction. If the plaintiff demonstrates
that the proportion of register voters adversely affected by the new law is
"significant" in that they comprise (a) approximately 5% of the registered
voters in a district, 3 2 or (b) that more than 50% of registered minority
voters3 1 3 disproportionately use the standard, practice, or procedure that the
jurisdiction aims to alter or eliminate, the jurisdiction must demonstrate that
the practice is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. 3 14 Beneath

this threshold, the presumption that the law is impermissible would not

312. See, e.g., Veasev, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 659 ("Based on the testimony and

numerous statistical analyses provided at trial, this Court finds that approximately
608,470 registered voters in Texas, representing approximately 4.5% of all
registered voters, lack qualified SB 14 ID and of these, 534,512 voters do not qualify
for a disability exemption. Moreover, a disproportionate number of AfricanAmericans and Hispanics populate that group of potentially disenfranchised
voters."); Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (E.D. Wis.) (finding that
approximately 300,000 registered voters in Wisconsin or roughly 9% of registered
voters in Wisconsin lacked a qualifying ID), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
313. See, e.g., McCrorv, 831 F.3d at 216 (discussing trial evidence which
showed that "60.36% and 64.01% of African Americans voted early in 2008 and
2012, respectively, compared to 44.47% and 49.39% of whites"); Ohio State
Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 830 (S.D. Ohio) ("[I]n the
2012 General Election, 19.55%/ of blacks reported voting EIP absentee ballots in

Ohio, whereas 8.9 1o of whites in the state reported they voted EIP absentee ballots.
The statistically significant results indicate that black voters were more likely to cast
EIP absentee ballots in the 2012 General Election than white voters." (alteration in
the original)), aff"d, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated sub nom. Ohio State
Con/erence of The Nat. Ass 'n For The Advancement of Colored People v. Husted,

No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014), and vacated sub nom.
Ohio State Conference of The Nat. Ass'n For The Advancement of Colored People

v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
314. A similar test has been proposed for constitutional challenges to voting
requirements and qualifications. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on
Voter Participation: New Pressuresfor A Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?,
35 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 643, 675 (2008) ("Instead of asking whether the

requirements at issue make voting excessively difficult for the plaintiff-voters (the
individual rights approach); or about the reasons for their enactment, the
reasonableness of their tailoring, or the presence or absence of key provisions (the
agnostic approaches); the courts would ask whether the requirements cause the
number or distribution of participating voters to deteriorate by more than a given
amount (x%). If so, the requirements would be deemed presumptively
impermissible, and would face strict scrutiny. If not, the requirements would be
deemed presumptively permissible, and reviewed very leniently.").
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apply,' 5 but the defendant jurisdiction would instead be required to
demonstrate that the state interests in the law outweigh the burden on voters
by a preponderance of the evidence.'
This formulation attempts to provide the factfinder with guidance for
how to weigh evidence of racially disparate impacts and apply the causation
standard, without resorting to vague terns like "traceable" and "contributing
cause." Rather, the fornulation mitigates the causation problem by requiring
the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of correlation3 17 or, that there is
a statistically significant relationship between the observed disparities in
participation and the challenged practice, as well as the disparities in political
participation and social or historical factors external to the political systemwhich is sufficient to meet the showing under Section 2.
Most importantly, the test enhances the focus on the disproportionate
and systematic exclusion of racial minorities from the political process based
on procedures or qualifications that correlate with race."" A facially race3 15. This model draws from the equal protection context adopting the sliding
scale based on the level of exclusion rather than the challenged practice's burden on
the right to vote. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428: Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Evplanations and
Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 324-25 (2007) ("This is in fact what the
Supreme Court's Burdick jurisprudence is largely about: a judicial endeavor to
create and then to heed relatively simple and objective indicators for whether
something is seriously amiss with the democratic process.").
316. This component of the test is adapted from Prof. Tokaji's test. See Tokaji.,
App/Ying Section 2, supra note 27, at 485.
3 17. Correlation suficed to meet the causal showing in Gingles, particularly
as it related to racially polarized voting: "For the purposes of § 2, the legal concept
of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent. It means
simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or
candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different races (or minority
language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62.

318. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY THE NEW POLITICS OF
VOTER SUPPRESSION 85-86 (2006) ("[I]t is illogical to ignore the correlation
between race and politics and profess that they exist in two artificial and distinct
boxes-racial animus and direct but tolerable politics. . . Our current discussion of
race and politics is counterproductive in that it encourages civil-rights advocates to
attempt to prove that political strategists are "racists" in order tojustify the continued
existence of voting-rights protections. It also prompts conventionally labeled
political 'opponents' of racial communities to dismiss real harms that stem from
exclusion along racial lines. Practices that suppress voters of color, even when
undertaken or tolerated for partisan purposes, facilitate racial inequality.").
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neutral qualification that interacts with existing structural inequalities to
exclude minorities from participating in the political process constitutes
participation harms that Section 2-as well as the Fourteenth Amendmentaim to rectify. 1 9 The test above seeks to lessen the plaintiffs burden by
defining "interacts" as correlation because, in some cases, correlation could
provide statistical grounds for inferring discriminatory intent. Lessening the
plaintiffs burden is justifiable on two grounds. First, lessening the burden
captures the new generation of voting qualifications or procedures that target
factors that may be considered proxies for race. In this way, lowering the
plaintiffs burden would allow groups to challenge practices that may allow
race discrimination, from systems external to the electoral one, to seep into
the political process undetected. In fact, the recent wave of voter ID laws and
other restrictive initiatives have been linked to attempts to reduce minority
voter turnout. 320 Such actions may constitute race-based intent, but might not
be challenged if the motives of the legislature cannot be ascertained and
proven. Lowering the plaintiffs burden would enable minority plaintiffs to
target these practices.
Second, the test recognizes the government's interest within the
appropriate, localized, social context.3 2 The difficulty in developing tests for
new forms of vote denial is that the mere presence of these policies does not
necessarily connote the presence of race-based intentional discrimination.
Stated differently, the existence of the newest forms of vote denial coupled
with evidence of disproportionate racial impacts, both within the political
process and external to it, does not automatically permit the factfinder to draw

&

3 19. See Elmendorf, supra note 107, at 419-420; see also Michael J. Pitts
Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting Disfranchisenent: Voter IdentificationDuring

Indiana s 2008 General Election, 25 J.L. & POL. 329, 330 (2009) ("At its most
foundational level, the debate surrounding photo identification requirements can be
resolved by balancing a photo identification requirement's ability to preserve the
integrity of elections by preventing in-person voter fraud against the extent to which
such a law limits access to democracy by preventing legitimate voters from casting
countable ballots.").
320. See Haygood, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 87, at 586 ("Reduced to their simplest terms,
Section 2's core values are that (I) racial context matters and (2) implicit bias counts.
As the Senate factors reveal, Congress intended to neutralize the effects of past racial
discrimination in the electoral arena by requiring courts to take account of race when
evaluating electoral systems and practices. In other words, Section 2's remedial
function elevates the importance of racial context as proof of causation." (footnotes
omitted)); Tokaji, Applying Section 2, supra note 303, at 483 ("[I]t is very important
that courts consider how the practice fits in (or does not fit in) with the body of
election rules and practices in the state.").
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the inference of discrimination. This is especially true to the extent that
judges concerned about the basis for inferring racial discrimination based on
disproportionate impact believe that state actors enacting voting procedures
or requirements that inflict disproportionate burdens on minority groups
should not be presumed to be enacting policies that are racially
discriminatory.
This presumption is fair to the extent one believes that race-based action
is confined to individual bad actors. It says nothing, however, about the ways
in which institutions-made up of individual actors, making subjective
decisions-operate, on the whole, to both facilitate exclusion based on racial
bias and perpetuate racial bias through exclusion. To protect against these
ills, the new test for vote denial must find a way to recognize and incorporate
institutional responsibility and mechanisms for reform.
Third, the new test recognizes these interests while at the same time
recognizing the role of structural forms of racism in American society. 2 2 By
structuring the test to allow plaintiffs to meet the evidentiary showing through
correlation, -and thereby, establish the inference of discrimination the test
allows plaintiffs to challenge facially race-neutral policies with
disproportional participation harms to minorities. Yet, by linking the
government's standard for rebuttal to the level of exclusion, the government's
burden will depend on the level of racial exclusion its policy generates; less
exclusion requires demonstrating rational government interests, and more
exclusion requires a narrowly tailored compelling interest. Structuring the
government's burden in this way might incentivize government actors to
adopt policies that do not have vastly disparate impacts between minorities
and non-minorities. It also focuses the inquiry on the test for violations of
Section 2-whether the challenged policy or practice results in unequal
access to, or participation in, the political process and moves the discussion
away from disputes involving impact-based claims and disagreement over
the appropriate level of causation.
Fourth, the formulation above, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate
correlation, is not just consistent with the results test, which requires that
plaintiffs establish a violation by showing that the political process is not
equally open to protected classes under Section 2, but is a congruent and
322. Congress stated explicitly that its motivation behind amending Section 2
to eliminate the requirement of intent-based discrimination for liability was that the
analysis as then construed focused too much of the inquiry on individual actions
rather that the structural forces causing the exclusion. See, e.g., Ortiz, 824 F. Supp.
at 520 (citing Senate Report to the 1982 Amendments).
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proportional remedy to redress infringements on the right to vote. A
correlation standard would allow the factfinder to infer discrimination in
jurisdictions where "plaintiffs lack of electoral opportunity owes to racebased decision-making by majority-group actors." 3 23 Even though Section 2
does not require a showing of intent-based discrimination, as noted above
Congress likely intended-and avoiding constitutional issues would
require-a showing of something more than mere disparate impact. In some
cases, that something more could be race-based decision-making. 324 Today,
for Section 2 claims, race-based decision-making could encompass practices
that are adopted or maintained because of racially discriminatory reasons,
such as an awareness of the racial impact3 2 5 of certain policies and
procedures.3 2 Here, the inquiry is not focused on a "smoking gun" that links
individual actors to discrete acts of discrimination, but rather focused on
holding institutions responsible for enacting policies with known
discriminatory effects. For example, in a concurring opinion, Judge Calabresi
argued that a future legislature's awareness of the racial impact of the 100to-1, crack-to-cocaine sentencing disparity may constitute an Equal
Protection violation.3 2 Judge Calabresi argued the following:

323. Elmendorf, supra note 107, at 421 (describing scope of injury under
Section 2). Professor Elmendorf's article focuses on conceptualizing vote dilution
claims under Section 2.
324. See id. at 384 ("A race-biased decision, as I shall use the term, is one that
would have been different had the race of the persons considered by the
decisionmaker been different.").
325. The awareness of the disparities inquiry could be incorporated into the
proposed Section 2 vote denial test as well. On rebuttal, plaintiffs may attempt to
refute the state's justification for its exclusionary policy by arguing that the state
was aware of the disparities and racial impacts of the particular qualification when
it chose to enact the law. This model would encourage legislatures to become aware
of the discriminatory impact of their policies and to keep records or documentation
of research into these disparities to avoid liability, providing additional grounds for
institutional accountability and even reform through informed decision-making. See
Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote De/aved is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to
Eliminated Election Administration Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted
Voters, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57, 57-59 (2008) (arguing for voter impact

statements).
326. For Equal Protection claims, this argument would be foreclosed by the
Supreme Court's holding in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and
Personnel Admin. Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). But see United States v.
Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
327. Then, 56 F.3d at 469 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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If Congress, for example, though it was made aware of both the
dramatically disparate impact among minority groups of enhanced
crack penalties and of the limited evidence supporting such
enhanced penalties, were nevertheless to act affirmatively and
negate the Commission's proposed amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines (or perhaps were even just to allow the 100-to-I ratio to
persist in mandatory minimum sentences), subsequent equal
protection challenges based on claims of discriminatory purpose
might well lie. And such challenges would not be precluded by prior
holdings that Congress and the Sentencing Commission had not
originally acted with discriminatory intent. As the Supreme Court
has pointed out, facially-neutral legislation violates equal protection
if there is evidence that the legislature has "selected or reaffirned a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
32
in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."m

Although it is perhaps not sufficient to state an Equal Protection claim,
the point is that, in some cases, awareness of dramatic racial disparities
resulting from the imposition of a voter qualification or election policy could
be sufficient to meet the plaintiffs burden under Section 2.
Finally, vote denial claims, unlike vote dilution claims, directly
implicate access to the ballot and/or the right to cast a ballot and have that
vote counted fairly. Qualifications that amount to vote denial and policies or
procedures that create unequal access to the political process for minorities
directly implicate anti-caste principles under the Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]his principle states that the concept of discrimination should
include not only intentional acts of disparate treatment but also
policies that "turn[] highly visible but morally irrelevant differences
into a basis for second-class citizenship." Because punch card voting
technology yields a racial gap in lost votes, it saddles minority
groups with social disadvantages that relegate them to the status of
a subject race and discourages them from participating in core
political activities, here the franchise itself. The implied social
message is that it is legitimate for the disproportionate risk of lost
votes to fall on black shoulders. whereas such risks may be regarded

328. Id. at 468 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citing Feene.,
442 U.S. at 279).
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Viewed through this lens, policies implicating access to the ballot or the
right to participate on equal footing in the political process by having one's
vote counted may confer Congress with greater latitude in protecting minority
voters from these forms of vote denial.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Assuredly, much progress has been made since the enactment
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. But in spite of the contributions
the majority quite properly credits with eradicating many of the most
glaring forms of discrimination in voting, the law has yet to ensure
that members of minority groups will have an equal opportunity to
participate in the political process. We cannot pretend .

.

. that the

discrimination prohibited by the Voting Rights Act has been
relegated to an unfortunate but closed chapter of American history.
Discrimination and its effects remain a part of our present reality. If
we deny the continued existence of this problem, we not only lose
our ability to recognize and remedy present instances of unlawful
inequality; we also guarantee that discrimination and the damage it
does to the integrity and effectiveness of democratic government
will be a more prevalent and intractable feature of our country's
future. 3 1
The statements by Judge Lewis ring true in an era characterized by new
forms of vote denial. In the realm of voting rights, racial progress in America
is reflected not only in the election of the first African American president,
but also in the increased participation rates of historically underrepresented

329. Moke & Saphire, supra note 226, at 55 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, The AntiCaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2445, 2449-51 (1994)). These new forms
of vote denial should trouble those concerned with preserving majoritarian values
and encouraging extensive participation In civic institutions by all groups. See, e.g.,
Rathod, supra note 300, at 205.
330. See Tokaji, Intent andIts Alternatives, supra note 17, at 370 ("Katzenbach

v. Morgan provides further support for the idea that Congress may have greater
latitude under the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting rights of participation, as
compared with rights of representation.").
331. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 319 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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However, although progress in the realm of voting rights has
groups.
certainly been made, empirical research shows that race still plays a
significant role in American politics.33 3 Importantly, the vestiges of structural
racism remain, as evidenced by such social and economic indicators as mass
incarceration,3 3 4 wealth inequalities, 3 home foreclosure disparities," and
the educational inequities.3 3" Thus, although the nature of the harms might
have changed, America still needs the Voting Rights Act.
332. The Voting Rights Act contributed to a rise in the number of minorities
elected to public office. See, e.g., Davison, supra notc 6, at 43 ("The number of
Black elected officials increased from fewer than 100 in 1965 in the seven targeted
states to 3, 265 in 1989. In 1989 blacks in these states comprised 9.8 percent of all
elected officials as compared with about 23 percent of the voting age population.
While no estimates for Hispanic officeholders in 1965 are available, their numbers
in six states with especially large Hispanic concentrations-Arizona, California,
Florida, New Mexico, New York, and Texas-increased from 1,280 in 1973 to 3,592
in 1990. Hispanic officials thus constitute about 4 percent of the elected officials in
those states, as compared with the Hispanic voting-age population of approximately
17 percent."), Haygood, supra note 30, at 1025-26 (citing data on increased
participation rates).
333. See Ansolabehere, et al., Race, Region. and Vote Choice in the 2008
Election: Implications/for the Future ofthe Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1385, 1387 (2010) ("The exit polls and election rctuns suggest that the 2008

election did not represent a fundamental shift in national patterns of race and vote
choice. However, these national patterns mask great variation at the state and county

level. In particular, Obama's relative success among white voters, as compared to
John Kerry four years earlier, varied greatly by region. In the Deep South, Obama
actually did worse than Kerry among white voters.... We view these findings as
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The tension between disparate impact and Equal Protection articulated
in Ricci is a variation of the same concerns highlighted in the impact-based
vote dilution context. Although it remains to be seen what this means for
disparate impact provisions under the Voting Rights Act, there is reason to
believe that these provisions might be similarly threatened. However, these
concerns are animated from disputes regarding the representation rights of
minority groups within a majoritarian democratic system, and, as such, they
bear little resemblance to the vote denial claims directly implicating access
to the ballot or reconstructing barriers to equal participation in the political
process. This article has highlighted the ways in which disputes surrounding
impact-based claims, such as vote dilution, have spilled over into the vote
denial context and hindered the ability of claimants to challenge an outright
exclusion from the political system and other forms of inequality. As the
article demonstrates, the reluctance of courts to accept evidence of "impact
plus" stems in part from concerns that the remedies required by impact-based
claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act will involve essentialism, an
affront to individual dignity, and require proportional racial representation as
a remedy. Although such objections are misplaced in the vote denial context,
the debates in this doctrine have exerted considerable influence in the vote
denial context and have impeded the ability of plaintiffs to prevail on these
challenges in court. The proposed test for vote denial claims builds on
previous tests, but addresses the concerns animating judicial discomfort with
impact-based claims while providing plaintiffs with an effective remedy for
challenging both exclusion from and disproportionate burdens in the political
system in a manner that affords due recognition to the state interests. By
enabling plaintiffs to challenge new forms of exclusion and inequality in the
political process, this article establishes a framework to aid plaintiffs in
challenging discriminatory policies and practices that threaten to forestall or
rollback the progress made under the Voting Rights Act in a post-Shelby
County world.

